R&DP-20-1(1/68)

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: *lgw* REVIEWED: *AK* KEYED: *rdb* PUNCHED: *B* VERIFIED: *R* 17 JUL 1969

7-11-69

CARD 1

Record Identification: Date: Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Source	Don't Count	Enemy Action	Aircraft Model: Mission Modif.		Basic Mission	Design Number			Series Symbol	Model Code		Aircraft Bureau Number						Reporting Custodian			Type Duty			Major Command	Time of Mishap: Condition	Local Time			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	9	Ø	5	Ø	7	1	Ø	3	Ø	1	Ø					A	Ø	Ø	7	A	Ø	6	1	5	2	6	6	4	3	Ø	9	3	2	1	1	4	Ø	1	2	8

Acdt. Dmg.	Acft. Dmg.	Acdt. Inj.	Acft. Inj.	Hull Number			Kind of Flight			Clearance	Location: Name Code							Bearing From		Dist. From	Fac. Rway Descrip.: Distance	Area	Runway Heading		Length	Was Duty Rwy Used?	Fac. Ship Descrip.: Ship Type	Ship Course		Ship Speed		Loc'n: Initial Contact	Final Rest		Trans. Code	Card Number		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
A	A	A	A				3	A	3	3	A	I	L	E	M	R	E			A															A	Ø	1	Ø

CARD 2

Relative Wind: Direction		Velocity		Density Altitude			Alt. of Emergency: Above Terrain			Pressure Altitude			Acft. Gross Weight						Fiscal Year		Fleets and Hows.																	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
3	2	Z	Z	Ø	Ø	2	A	Ø	Ø				Ø	Ø	2	3	8		6	9																	

			Property Damage Cost: Gov't.			Non Gov't.			Total Occupants This Acft.		Aircraft Injury Summary: Total Injuries "A" "U" "L": Navy		Non Navy		"A" Injuries: Navy		Non Navy		"U" Injuries: Navy		Non Navy		"L" Injuries: Navy		Non Navy		Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
			Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	1	Ø	1			Ø	1											A	Ø	2	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1 OF 7

7/11

R&DP-20-2(1/68)

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [handwritten initials] REVIEWED: ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 3

RECORD IDENTIFICATION — Date: Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Aircraft Injury Summary (cont'd): "B" Injuries Navy		"B" Non Navy		"C" Navy		"C" Non Navy		"D" Navy		"D" Non Navy		"E" Navy		"E" Non Navy		"F" Navy		"F" Non Navy		"G" Navy		"G" Non Navy		Total Injuries Navy		Total Non Navy		No. Occupants All Acft. Involved		
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
6	9	Ø	5	Ø	7	1	Ø	3	Ø	1																									Ø	1			Ø	Ø	1

ESCAPE SYS. DATA: Sys.	Component		Spec. Data														Component Separated From Aircraft		Pri Acdt. Type		Pri Phase of Operation			1st Acdt. Type		1st Phase of Operation			2nd Acdt. Type		2nd Phase of Operation			Trans. Code	Card No.		
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																			B	Z (6)	4	A	1	B	Z (6)	4	A	1						A	Ø	3	Ø

CARD 4

		3rd Acdt. Type		3rd Phase of Operation			Type Operations		Contributing Causes							Pilot Error Causal Fac.: First		Second		Third		Pilot Factor After Fact		Other Personnel Causal Factor: First		Second		Third		Other Pers. Factor After Fact		Inv. Mat. Comp. 1st Causal Factor: Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
							1		+ (Z)							~~N~~	~~5~~	~~6~~	~~2~~	~~X~~	~~V~~																

Involved Mat. Comp. (cont'd.) 2nd Causal Factor: Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		3rd Causal Factor: Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Material Fact. After Fact: Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Acft. Design Comp. Causal Factor: Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		DESIGN C.F.: Special Equipment	Pilot Equipment		Trans. Code	Card No.		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																											A	Ø	4	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 2 OF 7

R&DP-20-3(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [signature] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 6

Record Identification: Date (Cal. Yr., Mo., Day), Type Report, Log Line Number, Aircraft Number; Weather Causal Factor; Facility Causal Factor; Facility Fact. After Fact; Environ. Factor; Cause + Factor Primary (Misc, Wx Fact, Pers Factor, Mat, X Ref, COMP, Ass'y., Sub Ass'y.); Cause + Factor 1st Possible (Misc., Wx Fact, Pers Factor, Mat, X Ref, COMP, Ass'y., Sub Ass'y.)

01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
6	9	0	5	0	7	1	0	3	0	1									5	

22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
							1					N	5	1					N	5

Cause + Factor 2nd Possible; Cause + Factor 3rd Possible; Cause + Factor 4th Possible (each: Misc, Wx Fact, Pers Factor, Mat, X Ref, COMP, Ass'y., Sub Ass'y.); Special Attention; Special Data and Conditions; Trans. Code; Card Number

43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61
1					S	2	2					A	2					

62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
			G	D											A	Ø	6	Ø

CARD 8

Material Special Data: First Code, Second Code, Third Code, Fourth Code, Fifth Code; Maneu. Prior To Occur.; Operator Incapacitated C.F.

12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

Multi-Occurrences; Multi-Maintenance Problems; Trans. Code; Card Number

50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65

66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
												Ø	8	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 3 OF 7

R&DP-20-4(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 9

RECORD IDENTIFICATION													Aircraft Data																									
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		1st Flight After Maint.	D. I. R.	Tour	Hours Since Acceptance				Since Last Insp.						Since Last Par/O'Haul							Power Plant Model Number							
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day														Type	Hours			Days		Activity	Hours				Months									
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39
6	9	Ø	5	Ø	7	1	Ø	3	Ø	1								C		8	5			5		2	1	1	Ø	5								

Power Plant Serial Number										Primary Involved Material Component																											Trans. Code	Card Number		
										Manufacturers Part Number																Total Hours				Since Last Par/O'Haul										
																														Activity	Number	Hours								
40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																																					A	Ø	9	Ø

CARD 10

Pri. Inv. Mat. Comp. (cont'd)						Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component																															
Since Last Check Perf.						Manufacturers Part Number																Total Hours				Since Last Par/O'Haul						Since Last Check Perf.					
Type	Hours			Days																						Activity	Number	Hours				Type	Hours			Days	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

																											Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												1	Ø	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 4 OF 7

R&DP-20-6(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: Lp REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 11

RECORD IDENTIFICATION										
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	9	0	5	0	7	1	0	3	0	1

Controlling LSO's Carrier Pass Description																											
Start							Middle							In-Close							Ramp						
Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39

CLCPD (cont'd)																																								
TOUCH-DOWN																																					Trans. Code	Card Number		
Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position																																		
40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																																						1	1	0

CARD 12

12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

												File or Serial Number (Pilot)							Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
												[redacted]							5	2	5	1	E	1	A	1	A	1	2	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 5 OF 7

R&DP-20-7(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: *[initials]* REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 13

RECORD IDENTIFICATION																																								
Date													Emerg. Syst. Train.				Instrument Trainer				Time All Models				Time This Model										Number of →					
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Pilot Factor Inv.	Service Tour	Instrument Card	Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	9	Ø	5	Ø	7	1	Ø	3	Ø	1	T		2			1	Ø			Ø	1	Ø	4	Ø	7	Ø	8	Ø	6	Ø	6	1	6	3	7	1	1		Ø	Ø

Carrier Landings																																						
Total Nite This Model		This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days												File or Serial Number (Co-Pilot)							Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Service Tour	Instr. Card		Trans. Code	Card Number		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø																														A	1	3	Ø

CARD 14

Emerg. Syst. Train.				Instrument Trainer				Time All Models				Time This Model										Number of Carrier Landings																
Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model		Total Nite This Model		This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days						
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

				File or Serial Number (Instr. Plt. in Other A/C)								Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Service Tour	Instr. Card					Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												1	4	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 6 OF 7

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/9 (Rev. 5/69)

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ✓ REVISED: ___ LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: ___ VERIFIED: ___

CARD 15

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Emerg. Syst. Train.				Instrument Trainer				Time All Models				Time This Model						Number of Carrier →					
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number																										
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day							Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model		Total Nite This Model	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	9	0	5	0	7	1	0	3	0	1																													

Landings																																							
This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days				This Individual in Acft.			Name (Instr. Plt. in Other Acft.)																				Number of Personnel Records						Trans. Code	Card Number		
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																																					1	5	8

CARD 16

P								File or Serial Number (All Persons)							Name									Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. Exper.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Card Code 65				
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
P								(b) (6)							B	A	C	H	M	E	I	E	R		3	2	5	I	E	1	A	1	6	5			

Equip 1						Equip 2						Equip 3						Equip 4																
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number								
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80				
																												1	6	9				

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 7 OF 7

R&DP-30(6/68)

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: RECORDS DEPT

DATE 12 AUG 1969

TO: (1) CODING SECT
(2) REC CONT BRANCH 8 SEP 69
(3) ADPE DIV
(4) REC CONT BRANCH 8 SEP 1969

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ØØ" in Person Seq No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen Data Sect of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.									AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYP-RPT	LOG NUMBER			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	9	Ø	5	Ø	7	1	Ø	3	Ø	1

Backdate

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL OF FLD START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS		PERSON SEQ NUMBER		FIELD LENGTH		DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)										TAPE REC DIV NO.	TRANS CODE
				12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29		
1	SOURCE	Ø1	12	Ø	Ø	1	2	Ø	Ø	Ø	1	1											
				30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47		
2	CONTRIB CAUSES	Ø4	21	Ø	2	1	8	Ø	Ø	Ø	1	2											
				48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	77
3	PLT ERR CAUS FACT.	Ø4	28	Ø	2	2	5	Ø	Ø	Ø	6											Ø	1	M

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6) [redacted]

ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

R&DP-30(6/68)

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: RECORDS DEPT

DATE 12 AUG 1969

TO: (1) CODING SECT
(2) REC CONT BRANCH 13 9/1/69
(3) ADPE DIV
(4) REC CONT BRANCH 8 SEP 1969

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ØØ" in Person Seq No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen Data Sect of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.									AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYP-RPT	LOG NUMBER			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	9	Ø	5	Ø	7	1	Ø	3	Ø	1

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL OF FLD START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS				PERSON SEQ NUMBER		FIELD LENGTH		DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)										TAPE REC DIV NO.		TRANS CODE
				12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29			
1	PLT FACTOR INV.	13	12	Ø	6	8	8	Ø	Ø	Ø	1	2												
				30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47			
2	3RD PROB CAUSE	Ø6	5Ø	Ø	3	Ø	5	Ø	Ø	Ø	7	2					A	2						
				48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	77
3	1st Acft Type/#, 1st Acft Type	3	63	Ø	1	9	7	Ø	Ø	Ø	6	6	4	A	1	B	6					Ø	1	M

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6) [redacted]

ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/22 (REV. 5/69)

GENERAL DATA SECTION NARRATIVE BRIEF

I.D. Number	690207103	1	NNN	/	14	A
	1 2 Yr. / 3 4 Mo. / 5 6 Day / 7 Typ / 8 9 Log	10 Typ Brief	13 14 15 Narr File I.D.	69 CL / 70 71 72 73 Orig. Use	75 76 Tot-Cds	77 78 Trans. Code

"Common Fields to All Cards"

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf

CARD NO. CODED 6/4 REVIEWED 6/2 KEY PUNCHED _____ VERIFIED _____

01	COLL GND AFTER LIFT OFF NIGHT FMLP. REPL PLT ON 1ST N
02	IGHT FNLP PLT TOOK OWN W/O ON 1ST PASS, MADE TOUCH &
03	GO 2ND PASS. WHILE IN FINAL SECONDS OF 3RD APPR, 2 A/T
04	ACFT ENTERED BREAK OVERHEAD WHILE TOUCH N GO LAN MAD
05	E. PWR APPLIED, FOTNTION & CLB NORM WITH TWR ADVISING
06	TAKE INTERVAL ON BREAKING ACFT. NO ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY
07	PLT. ACFT OBSR TO TRANSITION FROM CLB @ 265 FT AGL T
08	O DIVE WITH IMPACT GND WINGS LEVEL & EXPLO. NO EJT AT
09	TEMPT OBSR. INVETS OF ENG, CONTROLS & ELEC SYS REVLD N
10	O DISCREP. PLT CONTINUOUSLY AWAKE 15½ HRS PRIOR ACDT
11	& HAD COMPLETED 2.2 HR HOODED LOW LEVEL NAV FLT WITH
12	MAL ADI 6.6 HRS PRIOR ACDT. PRI- PLT- BREAKDOWN OF IN
13	ST SCAN. CONTRIB- PLT- FATIGUE, FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE
14	DANGEROUS SITUATION.
~~15~~ 13	~~MAL ADI 6.6 HRS PRIOR TO ACDT. PRI- UNDET. PROB PLT-~~
~~16~~ 14	~~BREAKDOWN OF INST SCAN. PROB PLT- FATIGUE. PROB OTHER~~
~~17~~	~~PERS- SUPV- SKED SCHEDULING.~~
18	
19	
20	

CARD NO.

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION DIRECTOR CARD

NAVSAFECEN 3750 – 1/20 (NEW 3/69)

1 MR

28 AUG 1969

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: GB REVIEWED: JHP 8-14 LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: B.R VERIFIED: B.P.

RECORD IDENTIFICATION																												
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number			Trans Code	No. of Aircraft in Mishap							Corrected Mishap Identification Number									
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day																								
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
6	9	0	5	0	7	1	0	3	0	0		A	0	1															

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1 OF 9

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 1(ACFT)

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/21 (New 3/69)

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: RB REVIEWED: ___ LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: ___ VERIFIED: ___

Card 1

RECORD IDENTIFICATION: Date: Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Format No	Trans Code	Card Number			Reporting Custodian			Acft. Damage	Total Pers. This Acft		Model Acft: Mission Modif.		Basic Mission	Design No.			Series Symbol	Aircraft Bureau Number					
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35
6	9	∅	5	∅	7	1	∅	3	∅	1	1	A	∅	1		3	∅	9	A	∅	1			A	∅	∅	7	A	1	5	2	6	6	4

Altitude of Emergency: Terrain Clearance					Cabin Altitude					Ambient Altitude					Time At Alt.: At Cabin Altitude			At Ambient Altitude			Place in Formation	Cloud Condition	Time of Mishap: Horizon	Condition	DURATION OF FLIGHT		
36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63
					∅	∅	2	3	5	∅	∅	2	3	5							9	1	3	2	∅	∅	3

Card 2

Format No.	Trans Code	Card Number			Kind of Flight			Narrative Identification: Safety and Survival						Bio-Med						Combat Environment	Primary Cause	Enemy Action
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
1	A	∅	2		3	A	3	Y						∅	C	2	C				Z	

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 2 OF 9

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Type	8 Log	9	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Para Sequence	20 21 Tab. No. Cards
	6 9	F 5	0 7	1	0 3		0 1	2	A	0 1	2 1

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/10 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 3 OF 7

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CD NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 3		FILE/SERVICE NO. 01	0 0 2 2	0 7	(b) (6)
		1 3		NAME	0 0 2 9	0 7	BACHELL
		0 9		NAME (CONT)	0 0 3 6	0 3	ER
		0 7		RANK/RATE	0 0 3 9	0 1	S
		0 7		BRANCH OF SERVICE 02	0 0 4 0	0 1	N
		0 7		STATUS	0 0 4 1	0 1	E
		0 7		INJURY	0 0 4 2	0 1	A
		0 7		DISPOSITION	0 0 4 3	0 1	F
		0 8		DAYS HOSPITALIZED	0 0 4 4	0 2	
		0 8		DAYS QUARTERS	0 0 4 6	0 2	
		0 8		DAYS GROUNDED	0 0 4 8	0 2	
		0 9		UNCONSCIOUS	0 0 5 0	0 3	
		0 8		AMNESIA	0 0 5 3	0 2	
		0 8		EXPOSURE/SHOCK	0 0 5 5	0 2	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 BODY PART 03	0 0 5 7	0 7	(b) (6)
		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 DIAGNOSIS	0 0 6 4	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 CAUSE	0 0 7 1	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 BODY PART	0 0 7 8	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 DIAGNOSIS 04	0 0 8 5	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 CAUSE	0 0 9 2	0 7	

CD NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 BODY PART	0 0 9 9	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 0 6	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 CAUSE	0 1 1 3	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 BODY PART	0 1 2 0	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 2 7	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 CAUSE	0 1 3 4	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 BODY PART	0 1 4 1	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 4 8	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 CAUSE	0 1 5 5	0 7	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 1	0 1 6 2	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 2	0 1 6 8	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 3	0 1 7 4	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 4	0 1 8 0	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 5	0 1 8 6	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 6	0 1 9 2	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 7	0 1 9 8	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 8	0 2 0 4	0 6	
		0 8		X-RAY	0 2 1 0	0 2	
		0 9		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 1	0 2 1 2	0 3	
		0 9		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 2	0 2 1 5	0 3	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	69	05	07	1	03	11	2	A	01	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/11 (REV 2/68) CODE SHEET 4 OF 9

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 3	0218	03	
		08		AUTOPSY	0222	02	1
		10		MATERIAL TO AFIP	0223	04	
		07		AFIP REPORT	0227	01	
		11		ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 1	0228	05	
		11		ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 2	0233	05	
		11		ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 3	0238	05	
		11		ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 4	0243	05	
		11		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 1	0248	05	
		11		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 2	0253	05	
		11		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 3	0258	05	
		11		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 4	0263	05	
		11		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 5	0268	05	
		11		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 6	0273	05	
		11		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 7	0278	05	
		11		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 8	0283	05	
		08		ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL	0288	02	A
		12		LEAVE INFO DATE LAST LEAVE	0290	06	
		09		LEAVE INFO NO. OF DAYS/TYPE	0296	03	
		12		DATE LAST PREV FLIGHT	0299	06	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		09		HOURS FLOWN LAST 24	0305	03	
		09		HOURS FLOWN LAST 48	0308	03	
		10		MISSIONS FLOWN LAST 24 (2)/48 (2)	0311	04	
		12		HOURS WORKED LAST 24 (3)/48 (3)	0315	06	
		12		HOURS SLEPT LAST 24 (3)/48 (3)	0321	06	
		09		HOURS DUTY PRIOR TO MISHAP	0327	03	
		09		HOURS AWAKE PRIOR TO MISHAP	0330	03	
		09		HOURS DURATION LAST SLEEP	0333	03	
		08		TIME IN COCKPIT PRIOR TO MISHAP	0336	02	
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 1	0338	06	
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 2	0344	06	
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 3	0350	06	
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 4	0356	06	
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 5	0362	06	
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 6	0368	06	
		08		AGE	0374	02	
		08		HEIGHT	0376	02	(b) (6)
		09		WEIGHT	0378	03	
		09		SITTING HEIGHT	0381	03	
		09		TRUNK HEIGHT	0384	03	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	0 9	0 5	0 7	1	0 3	0 1	2	A	0 1	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750.1/12 (REV 2/59) CODE SHEET 5 OF 9

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

CODED _____ REVIEWED _____ LOGGED _____ PUNCHED _____ VERIFIED _____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		0 9		FUNCTIONAL REACH	0 3 8 7	0 3	(b) (6)
		0 9		BUTTOCK KNEE LENGTH	0 3 9 0	0 3	
		0 9		LEG LENGTH 13	0 3 9 3	0 3	
		0 9		SHOULDER WIDTH	0 3 9 6	0 3	
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 1	0 3 9 9	0 7	7 7 9 9 0 7 A
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 1 CONTINUED	0 4 0 6	0 6	
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 1 CONTINUED	0 4 1 2	0 4	
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 2	0 4 1 6	0 7	
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 2 CONTINUED	0 4 2 3	0 6	
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 2 CONTINUED	0 4 2 9	0 4	
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 3	0 4 3 3	0 7	
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 3 CONTINUED	0 4 4 0	0 6	
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 3 CONTINUED	0 4 4 6	0 4	
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 4	0 4 5 0	0 7	
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 4 CONTINUED	0 4 5 7	0 6	
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 4 CONTINUED	0 4 6 3	0 4	
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 5	0 4 6 7	0 7	
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 5 CONTINUED	0 4 7 4	0 6	
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 5 CONTINUED	0 4 8 0	0 4	
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 6	0 4 8 4	0 7	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 6 CONTINUED	0 4 9 1	0 6	
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 6 CONTINUED	0 4 9 7	0 4	
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 7	0 5 0 1	0 7	
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 7 CONTINUED	0 5 0 8	0 6	
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 7 CONTINUED	0 5 1 4	0 4	
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 8	0 5 1 8	0 7	
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 8 CONTINUED	0 5 2 5	0 6	
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 8 CONTINUED	0 5 3 1	0 4	
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 9	0 5 3 5	0 7	
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 9 CONTINUED	0 5 4 2	0 6	
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 9 CONTINUED	0 5 4 8	0 4	
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 10	0 5 5 2	0 7	
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 10 CONTINUED	0 5 5 9	0 6	
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 10 CONTINUED	0 5 6 5	0 4	
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 11	0 5 6 9	0 7	
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 11 CONTINUED	0 5 7 6	0 6	
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 11 CONTINUED	0 5 8 2	0 4	
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 12	0 5 8 6	0 7	
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 12 CONTINUED	0 5 9 3	0 6	
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 12 CONTINUED	0 5 9 9	0 4	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Type	8 9 Loc	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers. Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	6 9	0 5	0 7	1	0 3	0 1	2	A	0 1	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/13 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 6 OF 9

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

CODED: ____ REVIEWED: ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 13	0603	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 13 CONTINUED	0610	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 13 CONTINUED	0616	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 14	0620	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 14 CONTINUED	0627	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 14 CONTINUED	0633	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 15	0637	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 15 CONTINUED	0644	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 15 CONTINUED	0650	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 16	0654	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 16 CONTINUED	0661	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 16 CONTINUED	0667	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 17	0671	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 17 CONTINUED	0678	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 17 CONTINUED	0684	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 18	0688	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 18 CONTINUED	0695	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 18 CONTINUED	0701	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 19	0705	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 19 CONTINUED	0712	06	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 19 CONTINUED	0718	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 20	0722	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 20 CONTINUED	0729	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 20 CONTINUED	0735	04	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 21	0739	04	0101
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 22	0743	04	0602
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 23	0747	04	0701
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 24	0751	04	0501
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 25	0755	04	0315
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 26	0759	04	1201
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 27	0763	04	1303
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 28	0767	04	1703
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 29	0771	04	0202
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 30	0775	04	1917
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 31	0779	04	1903
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 32	0783	04	2103
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 33	0787	04	2201
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 34	0791	04	2012
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 35	0795	04	2503
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 36	0799	04	2201

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO 2(LONG)

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 8 9 Typ Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	6 9	0 5	0 7	1 4 3	4 1	2	A	6 1	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/14 (REV 2-69) CODE SHEET 7 OF 9

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 37	0 8 0 3	0 4	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 38	0 8 0 7	0 4	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 39	0 8 1 1	0 4	
		0		EQUIPMENT NO. 40	0 8 1 5	0 4	
		11		LOCATION IN AIRCRAFT	0 8 1 9	0 5	
		09		METHOD OF ESCAPE	0 8 2 4	0 3	7
		07		INTENT FOR ESCAPE 18	0 8 2 7	0 1	3
		07		EXIT USED	0 8 2 8	0 1	
		07		COCKPIT CONDITION	0 8 2 9	0 1	
		08		ORDER OF ESCAPE	0 8 3 0	0 2	
		09		REASON(S) FOR ESCAPE	0 8 3 2	0 3	
		08		COMMUNICATION PRIOR TO ESCAPE	0 8 3 5	0 2	
		10		NUMBER OF PREVIOUS ESCAPES	0 8 3 7	0 4	
		09		TERRAIN OF LANDING OR CRASH SITE 19	0 8 4 1	0 3	
		13		AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE	0 8 4 4	0 7	
		08		AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE CONTINUED	0 8 5 1	0 2	
		14		EJT. TRAINING/LECTURES	0 8 5 3	0 7	
		14		EJT. TRAINING/FILMS 20	0 8 6 0	0 7	
		14		EJT. TRAINING/ UNARMED SEAT	0 8 6 7	0 7	
		14		EJT. TRAINING/ ARMED SEAT	0 8 7 4	0 7	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		09		JUMP/PARASAIL/OTHER SCHOOL ROLE	0 8 8 1	0 3	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. BEFORE PROB. 1 & 2	0 8 8 4	0 6	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. BEFORE PROB. 3 & 4	0 8 9 0	0 6	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. DURING PROB. 1 & 2	0 8 9 6	0 6	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. DURING PROB. 3 & 4	0 9 0 2	0 6	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. AFTER PROB. 1 & 2	0 9 0 8	0 6	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. AFTER PROB. 3 & 4	0 9 1 4	0 6	
		11		TIME FROM EMER. UNTIL ESCAPE ATTEM.	0 9 2 0	0 5	
		09		REASON FOR DELAY	0 9 2 5	0 3	
		11		TERRAIN CLEAR AT ESCAPE	0 9 2 8	0 5	
		11		TERRAIN CLEAR AT FRONT. OPENING	0 9 3 3	0 5	
		09		AIR SPEED	0 9 3 8	0 3	
		09		GROUND SPEED	0 9 4 1	0 3	
		07		FRONT. DID NOT OPEN	0 9 4 4	0 1	
		12		PROTECTIVE HELMET CHINSTRAP/VISOR	0 9 4 5	0 6	
		08		CHIN STRAP NAPE STRAP	0 9 5 1	0 2	
		08		ZERO LANYARD	0 9 5 3	0 2	
		07		AUTO LAP BELT RELEASE	0 9 5 5	0 1	
		10		ACFT. CANOPY REMOVAL	0 9 5 6	0 4	
		09		EJECTION	0 9 6 0	0 3	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	79	05	07	1	3	01	2	A	01	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/15 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 8 OF 9

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

CODED ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED ____ PUNCHED ____ VERIFIED ____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		10		BODY POSITION	0963	04	
		09		SEAT POSITION/SEPAR TYPE SEPARATION	0967	03	
		12		Parachute Data Deploy/Open Shock/Oscillat	0970	06	
		10		PARACHUTE DAMAGE	0976	04	
		10		PARACHUTE DAMAGE CAUSE	0980	04	
		07		DIRECTION FACED AT CHUTE LANDING	0984	01	
		11		LANDING CONDITIONS (WEIGHT WINDS)	0985	05	
		09		DRAGGED BY CHUTE DISTANCE DRAGGED	0990	03	
		10		LANDING POSITION	0993	04	
		09		DEPLOYED BEFORE LANDING	0997	03	
		07		CANOPY DEFLATION POCKETS	1000	01	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAINING SWIM	1001	05	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAINING DILBERT DUNK 21	1006	05	
		11		PARACHUTE DRAG	1011	05	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN IMMERSED COCKPIT	1016	05	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN IMMERSED SEAT	1021	05	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN JUNGLE	1026	05	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN ARCTIC	1031	05	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN DESERT	1036	05	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN MOUNTAIN	1041	05	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		11		SURVIVAL TRAINING GENERAL	1046	05	1 9 6 6 6
		13		CONDITIONS AT SURVIVAL/ RESCUE SITE (TEMP WINDS)	1051	07	
		10		CONDITION AT SITE CONT. (WAVES)	1058	04	
		10		CONDITION AT SITE CONT. (TERRAIN WEATHER)	1062	04	
		11		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO ALERT (RESCUE VEH)	1066	05	
		10		TIME LAPSE OTHER ASSIST NO. 1	1071	04	
		10		TIME LAPSE OTHER ASSIST NO. 2	1075	04	
		11		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (RESC VEH)	1079	05	
		10		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (ASSIST NO. 1)	1084	04	
		10		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (ASSIST NO. 2)	1088	04	
		11		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (RESCUE VEH)	1092	05	
		10		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (ASSIST NO. 1)	1097	04	
		10		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (ASSIST NO. 2)	1101	04	
		11		TIME LOCATE TO REACH (RESCUE VEHICLE)	1105	05	
		10		LOCATE TO REACH (ASSIST NO. 1)	1110	04	
		10		LOCATE TO REACH (ASSIST NO. 2)	1114	04	
		11		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO RESCUE/ABANDON	1118	05	
		10		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO RESCUE COMPLETE	1123	04	
		10		TIME IN WATER	1127	04	
		10		TIME IN RAFT	1131	04	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP NARRATIVE CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 3

I.D. Number	69	05	07	03		3	A	12	
	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 8 9 Log		121 Format No.	13 Trans Code	18 19 Tot. No. Cards	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/19 (REV 2/69) CARD 9 OF 9

CODED: CC REVIEWED:

PUNCHED: VERIFIED:

CARD NO. 14 15 16

	22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71
01	FRP ON HIS 1ST NIGHT FMLP HAD COMPLETED TOUCH & GO
02	. ACFT WAS OBSERVED TO GAIN APPROX 250 FT ALT AND
03	THEN DESCEND WINGS LEVEL INTO GND. THE PLT DIED IN
04	STANTLY FROM EXTREME IMPACT FORCES + (b) (6)
05	(b) (6) . MOR INDICATES BREAKING INS
06	TRUMENT SCAN AT CRITICAL MOMENT WAS MOST PROBABLE
07	CAUSE OF ACDT. THE PLT SUPERCON INDICATE FATIGUE IN
08	DUCED BY A PRIOR 2.2 HR HOOPED LOW LEVEL NAV FLT +
09	15 HRS WITHOUT ADEQUATE REST CONTRIBUTED. IT IS CO
10	NSIDERED POSSIBLE THAT ACFT BREAKING OVERHEAD MAY
	22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71
11	HAVE CAUSED EITHER VISUAL ILLUSION OR FLT DISTRACT
12	ION
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	

14 15 16 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	6 9	0 5	0 7	1	3	0 1	2	C	0 1	0 1

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/10 (REV 2-69) CODE SHEET _____ OF _____

AIRCRAFT _____ OF _____ PERSONNEL _____ OF _____

CODED _____ REVIEWED _____ LOGGED 7/26/70 PUNCHED _____ VERIFIED 06 AUG 1970

CD NO 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 3		FILE/SERVICE NO.	0 0 2 2	0 7	
		1 3		NAME	0 0 2 9	0 7	
		0 9		NAME (CONT)	0 0 3 6	0 3	
		0 7		RANK/RATE	0 0 3 9	0 1	
		0 7		BRANCH OF SERVICE	0 0 4 0	0 1	
		0 7		STATUS	0 0 4 1	0 1	
		0 7		INJURY	0 0 4 2	0 1	
		0 7		DISPOSITION	0 0 4 3	0 1	
		0 8		DAYS HOSPITALIZED	0 0 4 4	0 2	
		0 8		DAYS QUARTERS	0 0 4 6	0 2	
		0 8		DAYS GROUNDED	0 0 4 8	0 2	
		0 9		UNCONSCIOUS	0 0 5 0	0 3	
		0 8		AMNESIA	0 0 5 3	0 2	
		0 8		EXPOSURE/SHOCK	0 0 5 5	0 2	
01		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 BODY PART	0 0 5 7	0 7	(b) (6)
		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 DIAGNOSIS	0 0 6 4	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 CAUSE	0 0 7 1	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 BODY PART	0 0 7 8	0 7	(b) (6)
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 DIAGNOSIS	0 0 8 5	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 CAUSE	0 0 9 2	0 7	

CD NO 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 BODY PART	0 0 9 9	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 0 6	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 CAUSE	0 1 1 3	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 BODY PART	0 1 2 0	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 2 7	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 CAUSE	0 1 3 4	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 BODY PART	0 1 4 1	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 4 8	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 CAUSE	0 1 5 5	0 7	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 1	0 1 6 2	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 2	0 1 6 8	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 3	0 1 7 4	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 4	0 1 8 0	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 5	0 1 8 6	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 6	0 1 9 2	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 7	0 1 9 8	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 8	0 2 0 4	0 6	
		0 8		X-RAY	0 2 1 0	0 2	
		0 9		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 1	0 2 1 2	0 3	
		0 9		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 2	0 2 1 5	0 3	

NAVAL SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

134/we
13 June 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NAVSAFECEN INVESTIGATION 65-69

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The Accident. A-7A, BUNO 152664, assigned to ATTACK SQUADRON ONE TWO TWO (VA-122), crashed on runway 32L at NAS Lemoore, California, at 0128(T) on 7 May 1969 and was destroyed (ALFA). The pilot, LTJG James F. BACHMEIER, USNR, (b) (6) [redacted], died in the crash. There was no damage to private property.

b. Synopsis of Flight. The pilot was on a scheduled night field mirror landing practice flight. Takeoff was normal. The pilot had made three approaches and two landings. During takeoff from the last landing, the aircraft climbed to approximately 300 feet AGL and then nosed over into a shallow glide till impact with the ground. The aircraft exploded upon impact and the ensuing fire destroyed approximately 60 percent of the fuselage, including the cockpit area.

2. INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

a. History

(1) The Pilot. LTJG BACHMEIER, age 24, was designated a Naval Aviator in August 1968 and had accumulated 397 flight hours, 370 in jet aircraft. He had flown a total of 80 hours in A-7 aircraft, 71 of these in the past three months.

(2) The Aircraft. A-7A, BUNO 152664, was accepted in October 1966. It had been through one progressive aircraft rework (PAR) at Naval Air Rework Facility (NAVAIREWORKFAC) Jacksonville in December 1968 and had since been flown 211 flight hours. A first calendar inspection was completed in April 1969 and the aircraft had since been flown 85 hours.

(3) The Engine. TF30-P-6 engine, serial number P651920, was accepted in February 1966 and had accumulated 443 operating hours. One overhaul was completed in September 1968 and it had since operated 233 hours. A major calendar inspection on the engine was completed in March 1969. Subsequently the engine was installed on this aircraft and it had since operated 85 hours.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

(4) Weather. Weather was not a factor in this accident.

b. Field Investigation

(1) The impact attitude was approximately 10 degrees nose down, slightly right wing down. The impact point was approximately 6000 feet from the approach end of the runway and 250 feet to the left of centerline.

(2) The engine indicated about 85 percent RPM at impact and is not considered a factor in the accident.

(3) There were external lights sighted by witnesses and instrument lights in the cockpit, indicating electrical power was present at impact.

(4) Witnesses concur that:

(a) There was one power reduction (from full to cruise power) approximately 10 seconds prior to impact. This reduction occurred as the aircraft reached the altitude of approximately 250 feet AGL.

(b) Other than the power reduction, there was no unusual noise or explosion prior to impact.

(c) The aircraft flight path was a smooth arc from takeoff to impact with no abrupt movements.

(5) A review of the tower tapes revealed there was no radio transmission from the pilot prior to impact.

(6) At the time of the accident there were six aircraft in the traffic pattern located as follows:

(a) One A-7 just past the 90-degree position in the night field mirror landing pattern (FMLP).

(b) One A-7 approximately abeam of the field LSO platform.

(c) One A-3 completing a deep, upwind turn.

(d) Two A-7s breaking into the pattern over the runway approximately abeam of the A-3 and passing over the aircraft that had the accident.

(7) There was no deviation from pertinent instructions, including LSO NATOPS, associated with this accident.

(8) The accident aircraft, just lifting off from a touch-and-go landing, was directed to take interval on the two A-7s entering the landing pattern.

(9) At the time of the accident the runway lights were turned out, except for the lights outlining the field carrier deck which is located on the approach end of runway 32L.

(10) A review of past work orders and pilots discrepancy sheets did not indicate any malfunctions that would have been a cause factor.

(11) On the day of the accident the pilot had flown a 2.1 hour radar low-level navigation flight. The briefing started at 1500(T), takeoff was at 1615(T) and he returned to the field at approximately 1830(T). He left the squadron area at 1915(T) for dinner at his quarters. LTJG BACHMEIER returned to the squadron at 2300(T) for the night flight brief and took off at approximately 0100(T). He had not slept since arising at 0830(T) the previous morning.

(12) Discussion with other students in the squadron indicated that the low-level radar navigation flight flown by this pilot on the day of the accident is a rather strenuous, fatiguing flight. It requires several hours of preparation. The student briefs the instructor on the prescribed route which is then flown completely under the thermal shield simulating actual instrument conditions.

(13) Under controlled conditions, with all appropriate witnesses in their original positions, a VA-122 pilot duplicated the landing pattern of the fatal aircraft.

From the duplicated flight pattern it was concluded that it was easily possible for the pilot to actually fly the aircraft into the ground at the desired spot from the altitude he had obtained and in the attitude witnessed at impact.

c. Analysis. The initial premise of this investigation was that the cause of this accident was either a system malfunction or material failure. After a complete field investigation of all the hardware it was concluded that there was no evidence to support the initial premise, therefore, an investigation of possible human factors was the next logical step.

A review of the pilot's training records (both Training Command and VA-122) revealed that he was slightly above average in all flight phases

except instruments, which was a bit below the average. The low-level radar navigation flight flown just prior to the fatal flight was considered by the instructor to be above average and the pilot was elated over the completion of this difficult flight in such a manner. The pilot's physical condition was considered good by the squadron flight surgeon.

d. Sequence of Events. Examination of the circumstances and known facts indicates the following sequence of events occurred. The pilot had in fact completed a good days flying upon completion of the low-level navigation flight. He probably did little to relax and rest in the interval from completion of the afternoon flight and the briefing for the night period. By the time he had briefed, manned the aircraft, taken off and joined the touch-and-go pattern he had been awake and active for a period of 17 hours (0830(T) 6 May to 0120(T) 7 May). The fact that this flight was at night must also be considered. The total time (17 hours) the pilot was awake coupled with the added strain of flying at night would certainly suggest a possible factor of fatigue. As the pilot completed his third pass two more aircraft joined the FMLP and he was directed to take interval on them. This necessitated transferring his scan from his instruments to the other two aircraft. As he lifted off these aircraft were estimated to be directly over his head and moving away from him. Upon reaching pattern altitude, a power reduction was made, he leveled off and set a nose attitude that was probably 4 to 6 degrees nose down. (In this attitude the aircraft would impact the ground in approximately 10 seconds, as in fact it did.) The pilot probably again fixed his eyes on these two additional aircraft after reducing power. Possibly due to mental and physical fatigue and the lack of outside references (runway lights were out) he never realized that he was in a fatal situation.

3. CONCLUSIONS

a. The cause of this accident was undetermined, however, a most probable cause was that the pilot inadvertently flew the aircraft into the ground.

b. A contributing cause was the probable fatigue of the pilot resulting from his long working day. This must be considered supervisory error, in that, this pilot had been scheduled for this type of working day.

4. ACTION COMPLETED. The Commanding Officer of VA-122 has directed that no student will be scheduled for more than 10 consecutive hours. All

possible care will be taken not to schedule flights at either end of this period with a long middle period of inactivity.

Distribution:
List "A"
CNO (OP-05F)
CNO (OP-098)

NAVAL SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

111B3/ck
3750/2
Ser 223
13 Oct 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Commander, Naval Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron ONE TWO TWO

Subj: VA-122 AAR ser 15-69A concerning A-7A BuNo 152664 accident occurring 7 May 1969, pilot BACHMEIER

1. The subject report and all endorsements have been reviewed. Concur with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. The cause of this accident has been recorded as UNDETERMINED with the following probable contributing factors:

a. PILOT:

(1) Breakdown of instrument scan.

(2) Fatigue.

b. OTHER PERSONNEL--SUPERVISORY (squadron scheduling).

3. Lack of visible horizon has been coded as an environmental factor in this mishap.

(b) (6) [redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E) (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMRCVW-12
NAVPRO DALLAS
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN
DIR AFIP

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K&DP-8 (11-67)

DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE OUT" LETTER ON ORIGINAL REVIEW

NOTE: 1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DEPARTMENT: None

1000126

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Records via 80 DATE: 9.22.69

FROM : 82

SUBJECT: Comments for close out letter

No specific aeromedical comments are offered. However, the problem of taking interval on aircraft breaking overhead at night, has been a problem before in at least 2 similar cases that I can recall. This particluar area of operation might deserve closer scrutiny as a source of optical illusion to pilots at night.

Fine!
22/80
See note.

VR

NAVSAFECEN 3750-9(11/67)

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to: Correction to:		Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750-1			/
DIR			/
Misc Items for Action or Correction			
To Code	From Code/Date	Hard-coded 6-10-69 by	
	511 / 8-5-69	Rough gig for 3rd End.	/
	/	sent to ComFairALAMEDA.	/
	/		/
	511 / 8-11-69	ORIGINAL REC'D rdb	/
511	512D / 7-2-70	Final review completed	/
	/	al document ready for the	/
	/	closed file. [illegible]	/
	/		/
	/	CLOSED	/
	06 JUL 1970		/
	/		/
	/		/
	/		/
	/		/

NAVSAFECEN 3750-10 Rev.(3[illegible])

UNIT VA-182
MODEL A7A
BUNO 152664

AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

ADVANCE ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING:
	M&M		9.29.69		
	LSD	9Oct	9Oct69	[illegible]	DO NOT ROUTE

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS:
REMARKS:

10 Oct 1969

ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NAVSAFECEN ~~26 SEP 1969~~
EXTENSIONS

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
111B3 AAD	29Sep		~~10-7-69~~	~~PKC~~	

130ct LSG

NAVSAFECEN ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT
1	R&DP			
2	M&M			
3	ADMIN			

~~BMS~~ 10/30/69

ROUTING AFTER CLOSE-OUT

DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
LSD				

NOTES: 1. No person other than those assigned to the Records Control Branch will remove any part of this document from the folder.

2. Departments will be fully responsible and accountable for documents in their custody until checked back into Records Control Branch.

3. Any department desiring to retain this report longer than five (5) working days must notify Records Control Branch of their need for extension.

COMMANDER FLEET AIR ALAMEDA

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
ALAMEDA, CALIFORNIA 94501

IN REPLY REFER TO:
FF7-2/3750
Ser 80/3109
15 AUG 1969

SPEEDLETTER

From: Commander Fleet Air Alameda
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center

Subj: VA-122 Aircraft Accident Report Serial 15-69A, concerning A-7A, BUNO 152664, occurring 7 May 1969, Pilot BACHMEIER

Ref: (a) COMNAVSAFECEN ltr ser 1705 of 11 August 1969

Encl: (1) COMFAIRALAMEDA ltr ser 80/2766 of 17 July 1969

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosure (1) is forwarded.

2. Commander Fleet Air Alameda records indicate that the subject mishap report was endorsed and forwarded on 17 July 1969. Informal liaison with Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet indicates that it was received, endorsed and forwarded to Commander, Naval Safety Center on 6 August 1969.

M. V. Dawkins

M. V. DAWKINS
Chief of Staff

Copy to: (w/o encl)
COMNAVAIRPAC
CO, ATTRON 122

NAVSO 5216/2 (REV. 6-65)
0104-904-1670

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NAVAL SPEEDLETTER

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☐ AIR MAIL ☐ REGISTERED MAIL

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

IN REPLY REFER TO

511/el
Ser 1705

DATE

11 Aug 1969

TO

Commander Fleet Air, Alameda
Naval Air Station
Alameda, Calif. 94501

NAVAL SPEEDLETTER—

Permits dispatch or informal language.

May be sent (1) with enclosures, (2) in a window envelope (size 8¼" x 3¼"), if contents are not classified as confidential or higher, (3) to both naval and nonnaval activities.

(Fold)

Subj: VA-122 Aircraft Accident Report serial 15-69A, concerning A7A, BUNO 152664, occurring 7 May 1969, pilot SACHMEIER

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6F

Naval Safety Center records indicate that the subject mishap report was forwarded to your command for endorsement on 26 June 1969.

Paragraphs 35c and 401 of reference (a) direct endorsers to forward endorsements within five (5) working days from date of receipt with two (2) copies to the Naval Safety Center. This endorsement has not been received and is requested.

(b) (6)

By direction

COPY TO

COMNAVAIRPAC
CO, VA-122

ADDRESS

Commander
Naval Safety Center
Naval Air Station
Norfolk, Va. 23511

SENDER'S MAILING ADDRESS

Address reply as shown at left; or reply hereon and return in window envelope (size 8¼" x 3¼"), if not classified as confidential or higher.

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969—346-892/A-271

3750
Ser 80/ 6459

6 - AUG 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VA-122 AAR ser 15-69A concerning A-7A BuNo 152664 accident occurring 7 May 69, pilot BACHMEIER

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center

Subj: VA-122 AAR ser 15-69A

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6F

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements.

2. Based on the contents of the report, the cause of this accident is undetermined as proposed in the third endorsement. Considering the pilot's long work day, previous demanding flight, and the blackness of the evening, some degree of fatigue may have adversely influenced the pilot's flight instrument scan at a critical moment.

3. Recommendation two in part IX of the basic report is sound and is supported.

4. Since the change of a primary flight instrument was suspect in this mishap, the inclusion of a maintenance officer's statement, relative to the aircraft's recent maintenance history, as set forth in paragraph 36c of reference (a), would have aided reviewers in assessing all facts in this mishap.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Force Safety Officer

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMREDATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
COMFAIRALAMEDA
CO ATKRON ONE TWO TWO
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
DIR AFIP
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN

8-11-69

FF7-2/3750
Ser 80/2766
17 JUL 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VA-122, Accident, Serial 15-69A, concerning A-7A, BUNO 152664, of 7 May 1969, Pilot BACHMEIER

From: Commander Fleet Air Alameda
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: ATKRON 122 Aircraft Accident Report Serial 15-69A

1. Forwarded, concurring in the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board and subsequent endorsements with the following exception:

a. The thorough investigation and meticulous analysis conducted by the board is highly commendable. Despite exhaustive efforts, no material failure or malfunction was detected as having contributed to or caused the accident. Additionally, no positive pilot factor was uncovered as a primary or contributing cause. It is the opinion of this endorser that the primary cause be listed as undetermined, with the most probable factor being the error of inattention/distraction by LTJG BACHMEIER.

2. The following administrative errors are noted:

a. Second endorsement should be numbered page 15 vice 14.

b. First endorsement should be numbered page 14 vice 13.

c. First endorsement distribution list should include "COMNAVSAFECEN (2)" and "DIRECTOR ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY".

d. Part I, Section A, block 3, insert "MAY" after DTG.

e. Part I, Section C, block 1, insert first name "James".

M. V. DAWKINS
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)
COMNAVSAFECEN (2)
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COMNAVAIRTESTCEN
DIRECTOR ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
NAVPRO DALLAS
COMFAIRMATECARAIRWING 12
CO, ATKRON 122

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

COMRCVW-12:sn
3750
Ser 80/ 552

26 JUN 1969

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VA-122 Accident serial 15-69A, concerning A7A BuNo 152664 of 7 May 1969, Pilot BACHMEIER

From: Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing TWELVE
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air, Alameda
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VA-122 Aircraft Accident Report serial 15-69A

1. Forwarded, concurring with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, and the remarks of the first endorser.

P. R. Craven
P. R. CRAVEN

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E)
COMNAVSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA
NAVPLANTREPO, DALLAS
CO, VA-122
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN, PAX RIV
DIRECTOR ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

VA122:00
3750
Ser:1028
3 JUNE 1969

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VA-122 Mishap Serial 15-69A 7 May 1969, A7A BUNO 152664, Pilot BACHMEIER

From: Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron 122
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing TWELVE
(2) Commander Fleet Air Alameda
(3) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VA-122 Mishap Serial 15-69A 7 May 1969, A7A BUNO 152664, Pilot BACHMEIER

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusion that the primary cause of the accident was pilot error.

2. This command will more closely monitor scheduled activities of all pilots to guard against fatigue contributing to a recurrence of this tragic mishap.

3. Recommendations 2 and 3 have been implemented.

4. The latest safety survey was conducted in May 1969.

Marvin M. Quaid Jr.
MARVIN M. QUAID, Jr.

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E)
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
NAVAIRTESTCEN PAX RIVER

COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMNAVAIRPAC

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with
Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART 1 GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY: CO ATKRON 122	2. SERIAL NO: 15-69A	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP: 07 0128T MAY	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT: A7A	5. BUREAU NUMBER: 152664
6. TO: Commander, Naval Safety Center		9. LOCATION OF MISHAP: NAS Lemoore		10. DAMAGE: Alfa
7. VIA: CO, ATKRON 122; COMRCVW-12 ✓; COMFAIRALAMEDA ✓; COMNAVAIRPAC ✓	8. X	11. TIME OF DAY: Night	12. TIME IN FLIGHT: 0 + 17	13. FLIGHT CODE: 3A3
		14. CLEARED FROM: NAS Lemoore	TO: NAS Lemoore	
		15. TYPE CLEARANCE: Local	16. AIRSPEED: 145 KIAS	17. A/C WEIGHT: 23,800
18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP: Impacted ground after liftoff FMLP Touch & go			19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP: S.L. 235' TERRAIN 0	

20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C): NA

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
X	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9. SERVICING PERSONNEL		17. WEATHER
	2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
	3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11. OTHER PERSONNEL *(Specify)*		19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	4. PILOT OTHER *(Specify)*		12. ADMINISTRATIVE		20. DESIGN OTHER *(Specify)*
	5. CREW		13. FACILITIES RUNWAY, OVERRUN TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
	6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14. FACILITIES NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, MIRROR)		22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15. FACILITIES CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR *(Ship or field)*		23. UNDETERMINED
	8. SUPERVISORY OTHER *(Specify)*		16. FACILITIES OTHER *(Specify)*		24. OTHER *(Specify)*

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	2. GRADE	3. FILE/SERVICE NO.	4.	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7.	8. INJURY	9. POSITION	10. CODE
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap): BACHMEIER, J. F. (JAMES)	LTJG	[redacted]		USNR	24	1	RP	Pilot	A
CO-PILOT (Identify & submit separate page 3)									

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11. ALL MODELS		400	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	10 / 0
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		241	18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	20 / 2
				IN MODEL	20 / 2
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		72	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	2.6 / 3.4
				IN MODEL	2.2 / 3.4
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	82	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	16.1 /
	OFT/CPT	10.5 / 1.5		IN MODEL	13.8 /
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	82	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap) HELOS (if helo mishap)		371
	OFT/CPT	10.5 / 1.5			
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	66	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	6 May 69
	OFT/CPT	6 / 0		DURATION	2.2
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK		Not Qual until comp RCVW syllabus	24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		Standard

OTHER PERS

25. NAME (Last, first & middle initial)	26. GRADE	27.	28. BRANCH OF SERVICE	29. FILE/SERVICE NO.	30. UNIT	31. INJURY	32.	33. POSITION

OP-0157

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 2 — Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

PART II MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

A. A/C HISTORY

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST PAR/OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK

B. ENGINE HISTORY

1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR REQUESTED?	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)									
(2)									
(3)									
(4)									

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS ON PART	4. NO. OF OVERHAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR REQUESTED?	8. SER. NO. FUR/AMPEUR
(1)							
(2)							
(3)							
(4)							

D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS

1. PARTS REPAIRED

PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE	3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED

2. PARTS REPLACED

PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

E. ENGINE FAILURES

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)

AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. IAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE
8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT ☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED	10. ALTITUDE	11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL ☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL		14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS
INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS		16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS				

RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/BMEP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE
INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS		26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS				

F. OTHER REPORT

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. AMPFUR SERIAL NUMBER _____

2. OIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP _____ *Info NAVCOMPARS OIR reports. See para. 10 OPNAVINST 3750.6E*

3. OTHER PRELIM REPORT OF ACCIDENT VA-122 071237Z May 1969

4.

OP-459F

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para 4A, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

G. SHIPS DATA

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR	2. PRESSURE SETTING	3. WIND OVER DECK	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACH/LAND SPEED

6. MARK NUMBER	7. MODEL RUNNER	8. LOCATION OF SHIP	9. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND BRIDLE ARRESTER

10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/ BARRICADE							

H. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS/LANDING LAST 30 DAYS
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD		
5. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

I. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY 51°F / OUTSIDE AIR	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
None	12	321/2		47°F	29.83

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (winds aloft, wind lines, sea state, density altitude, as appropriate)

Density altitude + 190

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS	2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
				[redacted] CO NAVAIRSYSCOM ✓ CO COMNAVAIRPAC ✓ CO COMNAVAIRALAMEDA ✓ CO COMHCVW-12 ✓ CO NATC PAX RIVER ✓ CO NAVPLANTREPO DAL ✓ [redacted] CO APTP ✓

COST DAMAGE TO	3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	4. PRIVATE PROPERTY	5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO
		None	27 MAY 1969

SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

[redacted]	[redacted]
LCDR, USN	Safety Officer
Carrier/Leadership/Ed. Trg. UNIT BILLET	UNIT BILLET
[redacted]	[redacted]
LCDR, USN (MC)	Asst. Weapons Officer
UNIT BILLET	UNIT BILLET

When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

OF-055

PART V

THE ACCIDENT

NJ 209, A7A BUNO 152664, pilot [redacted], launched from runway 32 right at NAS Lemoore at 0111T on 7 May 1969 on an authorized night field mirror landing practice (FMLP) flight (enclosure (1)). Fuel quantity at start was 8,100 pounds requiring the pilot to climb out to a minimum altitude of 6000 feet, dump excess fuel in order to be at a maximum of 6000 pounds on his first practice landing, and to report the initial for pattern entry on the primary FMLP runway, 32 left.

Preflight, post start checks, taxi and launch were normal and the pilot reported Westhaven initial for FMLP at 0116 (enclosure (2)). Lemoore tower advised NJ 209 to call the break, and advised him that runway lights were off, flight deck lights on. The pilot made a normal break, taking interval on an A3 already established in the pattern. He called the abeam position on his first pass, did not have external lights set up correctly abeam, adjusted his lights, flew an angling approach, was not set up on the ball and executed his own wave off (enclosure (3)). He turned downwind for his second approach, called the Ball at 0124, fuel weight 6000 pounds, and continued in for a touch and go landing. During the final seconds of his approach radio traffic began to increase with two more A7s calling initial and a technique discussion took place between the LSO and the A3 pilot. NJ 209 turned downwind for his third pass, his interval still the A3, and was approaching the abeam position when the flight of the two A7s broke behind him. A second section of A7s entered the break as he flew his third approach to a successful touch and go landing. His touchdown, power application, rotation and climb were normal and tower advised him after lift off that his interval was a flight of two breaking upwind. He did not acknowledge the transmission and was observed to transition from a climb to a dive and his aircraft impacted the ground at 0128 in a wings level attitude just off the left hand edge of the runway (enclosure (4)). The aircraft exploded on impact and burned (enclosures (4), (5) and (6)). The fires were extinguished by the NAS Lemoore crash crew and the pilot died in the crash. No ejection attempt was observed.

PART VI

DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT

NJ 209 A7A BUNO 152664 impacted the ground 50 feet to the left of runway 32 left on a heading of 310 ± 2° at NAS Lemoore (enclosure (7) and (8)). Aircraft attitude at impact was approximately 6° nose down, 10° right wing down. Airspeed was 145 kts true. The aircraft was in the landing configuration, landing gear and flaps down. The nose gear made first contact and sheared followed by the right main gear, then the left. All struts exploded on impact. The lower empennage and arresting hook assembly were torn away and the aft fuel cell ruptured. An explosion and fire ensued which demolished the entire aft fuselage section, separating vertical and horizontal stabilizers. The wings, forward fuselage and engine, strewing parts, continued to a final resting place 430 feet from the initial impact point and burned intensely (enclosure (9)). The canopy unlocked on impact and flew clear of the main wreckage, sustaining only minor damage. Wings separated from the fuselage and the forward fuselage section from frame 346 forward tumbled and burned, leaving windshield plexiglass, portions of the ejection seat and pilot's equipment in its path. The NAS Lemoore hard stand crash crew observing the crash and having only a short distance to go, were on the scene very quickly and through their efforts it was possible to salvage cockpit instruments for investigation purposes. All parts, with the exception of the cockpit canopy, suffered impact and fire damage.

PART VII

INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

1. General

The Board proceeded with the investigation on the assumption that a material failure or malfunction existed at the time of the accident. On the day following the accident, the Board was joined by a Safety Center investigator whose technical knowledge was of great value during the course of the investigation.

Three failure areas; engine, controls, and electrical, were selected as possible causes and were subjected to minute investigation. A discussion of findings follows:

(a) Engine failure: The TF 30 P6 engine and components were examined at the crash site and later removed to NMA to be disassembled. The engine's N1 compressor first stage was stripped of half it's blades and indicated at least one turn after impact against strong resistance. All blades showed bending counter to the normal direction of rotation and severe FOD. Inlet guide vanes were all cracked at their bases indicating sudden stoppage and severe torque on the forward part of the engine. The N1 compressor second stage was also bent counter to normal direction of rotation and was damaged by first stage blades and a mixture of dirt and gravel. Disassembly of the engine showed similar damage and dirt ingestion to extend through all N1 compressor stages but no further. The hot section and burner cans showed no damage nor did the turbine. The number six bearing and scavenge pump were undamaged and had no signs of wear. Samples of clean, amber oil were taken and proved negative on analysis. The accessory gear case was broken open on impact and its parts strewn over 400 feet indicating the dissipation of energy that should be expected if it was operating normally. The power shaft gear and its meshing main accessory drive gear indicated normal N2 rotation prior to, and for a time after, impact. Engine instruments recovered indicated 1950 PPH fuel flow and 630° turbine inlet temperature.

The final opinion of the assembled experts was that the engine was operating normally at 83 ± 2% RPM at impact.

(b) Control failure: due to the location of the crash site near the edge of the runway and the nose down, near wings level altitude at impact,(confirmed by witnesses, ground scars, damage, and instruments), control malfunction in pitch was suspect. UHT actuators and the pitch trim motor were disassembled. The actuators were in good condition. bleed plugs secure and properly wired. The two cylinders had an ample quantity of hydraulic fluid on both PC1 and PC2 sides. Both UHTs were in the same relative position at impact. The pitch trim motor was intact and functioned normally after it was removed and power applied to it. Pitch trim was set at 5° nose up, a trim setting that is "Hands off" at about 140 KIAS. level flight in the dirty configuration. The cockpit trim indicator was showing about 4° nose up.

Further discussion on the control system will be found under pilot factors. No discrepancies were found in any of the components.

(c) Electrical System failure: The possibility of an electrical system or cockpit lighting failure was examined closely. Eye witnesses confirmed aircraft exterior lights up to impact. The emergency power package was not deployed, therefore the main generator was on the line. Cockpit lighting controls were in the expected position, with flight instrument, non-flight instrument, console and dim flood lights on. Critical flight instrument lights were intact and operated on bench checks. All warning, caution and advisory bulb filaments were inspected and determined to be off at impact. Console light bulb filaments showed evidence of being on at impact. Agreement of the main and standby attitude indicators precluded the failure of either instrument, and their agreement with witness accounts indicated proper operation.

The Board found no evidence of electrical system malfunction or failure.

2. Pilot Factors

LTJG BACHMEIER was designated a Naval Aviator August 1968. His flight grades throughout basic and advanced training were generally above average. Minor difficulties were noticed in instrument navigation phases but he did very well in the basic instrument stages. After reporting to VA-122 he completed VA-127's instrument course in the TA4 with a grade of 2.94 (2.96 average RP grade) and was described as "middle of the road" in instrument ability. His progress in the A7 was smooth. The VA-122 instrument stage was completed with a 2.96 grade. Minor scan difficulties were indicated on two flights but nothing that could be considered serious.

LTJG BACHMEIER had recently returned from a two week weapons deployment to Yuma Arizona on which he flew regularly at night and showed average ability. He had two low pullouts on night bombing runs but not dangerously low. He had reached the stage in A7 training, with 82 hours in type, where all that remained in the RAG syllabus was FCLP, Carqual and three other advanced stage flights.

At 1500 on the afternoon of 6 May 1969, LTJG BACHMEIER reported for his first scheduled activity of the day, briefing for a PNR-3 hop. The PNR-3 is a very demanding low level full systems flight flown solely on instruments under the hood, or, in the case of the A7, under the radiation shield. Generally, most Replacement Pilots feel that successful completion of the PNR-3 is "Graduation Day" in the A7. The flight demands extensive and meticulous planning and a great deal of study. LTJG BACHMEIER was well prepared and the flight, of 2.2 hours duration, was well flown. They launched at 1620 and returned at 1830. After a debrief LTJG BACHMEIER went home for dinner and some rest prior to his next scheduled activity. His sojourn at home, however, could not be considered too restful (enclosure (13)). At 2330 he was picked up by a fellow RP and returned to the squadron for his first night FCLP period. The LSO gave a 15-20 minute detailed brief on procedures which stressed the importance of the instrument scan in the night FCLP pattern.

LTJG BACHMEIER, after the brief, preflighted and manned NJ 209. According to his plane captain, the preflight, start and taxi evolutions were routine. His aircraft had an ASN-50 (attitude and heading reference system) gripe that had been repaired by replacement of the main gyro unit and ground checked. The indicator had spun on the previous flight while the pilot was doing overhead maneuvers but gave normal indications at all other times. The accident board checked out the indicator, and in spite of damage it functioned properly. The board also retrieved the replaced gyro and found that although defective it would not have produced the failure described by the pilot. Therefore it is surmised that the discrepancy was not actually corrected and could have recurred had the aircraft been subjected to stres in high "G" maneuvering. The policy of assigning an aircraft with a previous primary flight instrument discrepancy, even through the discrepancy has been written off, to a night or instrument flight is questioned. The acceptance of such an aircraft by the pilot is also questioned. The board feels, however, that the gripe was not a factor in this accident. A failure of this type would be induced by a loss of any one of three phases supplying power to the system. The phase loss could stem from a number of areas if the aircraft was subjected to stretching under stress. The very nature of LTJG BACHMEIER's flight precludes sustained high "G" maneuvering and he should have had normal operation. As mentioned earlier, agreement of the ASN-50 and the standby gyro indicated proper operation of both instruments, as did the absence of erratic maneuvers.

LTJG BACHMEIER launched at 0111 from runway 32 right. Excess fuel on board (8000 lbs) required him to dump fuel to landing weight (6000 lbs) and enter the initial for 32 left the primary FMLP runway. This phase was accomplished without incident and LTJG BACHMEIER called the initial at 0117. The night could best be described as black. There was a half moon, but a high thin layer of clouds obscured it most of the time and during these periods the horizon was not visible. LTJG BACHMEIER broke downwind over the lighted field carrier deck and entered the FMLP pattern. Runway lights were not lighted because an A3 was already established in the pattern and it was LTJG BACHMEIER's interval. He was admonished by the LSO, after calling abeam, for not having his exterior lights properly set up. Through a combination of being slightly wide abeam and adjusting his lights he overbanked and flew an angling approach to the runway. Picking up a late ball and not set up, he executed his own wave off and turned downwind to take interval on the A3. His next approach to a touch and go was without incident. He was a little rough and went low in the middle but responded to an LSO call. At this point the situation became a little hectic in the pattern. A flight of two A7s called the initial, the tower

gave them break information, and a dissertation between the A3 pilot and the LSO took place, cluttering the air. However LTJG BACHMEIER's interval was still the A3 and his turn downwind after lift off was accomplished with no difficulty. On his third approach he called the ball with 5800 pounds fuel, completed his touch and go and rotated to a normal climb. Just prior to his touchdown a second flight of two A7s entered the break and were given interval on the A3. The attention of both LSOs was diverted at this point to an aircraft low at the abeam position and the controlling LSO called a warning to him. The tower operator's attention was on LTJG BACHMEIER's aircraft and he called out BACHMEIER's interval as a flight of two A7s breaking upwind. At the time of the interval transmission the flight of two A7s was directly ahead of BACHMEIER and opening so that all he had to do was look straight ahead to sight them. The tower operator and one of the hard stand crash crew personnel observed NJ 209 to transition from the climb to a nose down wings level attitude until it impacted the ground. The tower operator had no time to broadcast a warning (the transmission to the A7 low at the 180 was equally important) but called "Crash" as he realized that the aircraft was not going to recover. Two other witnesses observed the aircraft in its descent and stated that the aircraft added power prior to impact, but analysis of distance and sound travel proved that the power application they heard was the power applied on the touch and go.

The crash crew operator near the runway stated that the only power change after application on the touch and go was the "usual" reduction made as aircraft transition to a level-off. After the accident board had reached the conclusion that the aircraft had not suffered a failure the Safety Officer member of the board launched in a similarly weighted aircraft for reconstruction of the accident. With an investigator on the ground timing, and the same control tower operator in the tower, the approach, landing, rotation and power application, reduction of power and transition to a nose down wings level attitude pointing at the initial impact point 5500 feet up the runway was duplicated. The tower operator corrected the pilot's transitioning altitude until satisfied that the pattern was exact. The flight profile substantiated evidence found in the wreckage and in witness' statements very closely. The time from initial touch down to final impact was 23 seconds. Adjusted for the speed of sound in the existing calm wind situation the time agrees with the power application heard "just prior to impact" by the witnesses approximately 1½ miles away. The altitude reached by the aircraft in the climb/dive transition was 500 feet MSL or 265 feet AGL. Normal pattern altitude is 700 feet MSL. The transition from an optimum angle of attack climb to the 5.5 degree nose down attitude required to reach the impact point can be completed with ease and once the attitude is reached it takes only 4-5 seconds for the aircraft to impact. Airspeed in the nose down attitude was 145 kts true. LTJG BACHMEIER's true airspeed

indicator was frozen at 145 kts. Aircraft heading was 308 degrees, 12 degrees left of runway heading. Both BACHMEIER's ADI and HSI were on 308. Gyros from the stricken aircraft agreed with eye witness accounts and ground scars.

In view of the above the board feels that LTJG BACHMEIER flew his aircraft into the ground under controlled conditions and further that he was totally unaware of impending disaster. The aircraft broke up almost immediately and caught fire, main portions slid for 400 feet. The undamaged cockpit canopy detached almost immediately due to impact "G" unlocking the handle exposing the pilot to fire. The canopy gas actuator showed heavy heat damage prior to its entension indicating that it was "cooked off" rather than deliberately fired. As the fuselage and wings separated, pieces of the ejection seat were torn loose and the pilot was exposed to forces strong enough to tear the boot sole from his right flight boot. The cockpit area was engulfed in fire and tumbled to its final resting place, inverted. The pilot and the remainder of the ejection seat were thrown clear of, but within 15 feet of, the forward fuselage. The pilot's helmet, with oxygen mask fittings badly damaged by fire, was 30 feet from the pilot's body with all straps burned away. The pilots oxygen mask showing flash fire damage, oxygen supported, was thrown clear of the fire area 50 feet from the pilot's body. The oxygen hose detached below the mask and was partially consumed by fire 180 feet short of the pilot's body. There was no possibility of an attempted ejection.

Inattention to flight instruments for a brief 5-6 seconds while transitioning was sufficient to cause LTJG BACHMEIER to crash his aircraft. Searching for his interval or interpreting their relative movement, distraction induced by extraneous transmissions during his three approaches, disruption of his interval with the arrival of additional aircraft, fatigue after a long day and a very demanding earlier flight all could have combined to cause a scan breakdown. The lack of a visible horizon made it a necessity to fly primarily on instruments throughout the majority of the approach. Failure to maintain his instrument scan in a critical transition phase proved fatal to the pilot.

3. Material Failures or Malfunctions. None

4. Facilities.

(a) NAS Lemoore's hard stand crash truck, due to the alertness of it's civilian crew, was on the roll instantly and should be commended.

(b) The NAS Lemoore Tower Controller's actions could not be critized. The elapsed time between the NJ 209 transition to a nose down attitude and impact was no more than ten seconds, and the interposition of an important LSO call at the crucial moment cut this time to about two seconds. His decision not to interrupt the LSO's transmission to the aircraft low at the 180, for a situation he was unsure of, is considered sound.

5. NATOPS is not considered a factor.

6. Maintenance, Servicing, and Ground Handling Personnel Factors. None.

7. Supervisory Factors.

(a) The Board feels that LTJG BACHMEIER was overscheduled. In view of the complexity of the PNR-3 Low Level Flight it is felt that the flight itself constitutes a full day's work. It is noted that the Flight Schedule, as written, commits LTJG BACHMEIER to a 15 hour work day. However, it is misleading in that the FMLP period is a block time from 0155 to 0600 and there is no breakdown for indivial periods. Dependent upon aircraft availability, priority is established for assignment of aircraft by the Operations Duty Officer according to the severity of the working day for the pilots concerned. LTJG BACHMEIER was assigned his aircraft early and launched 10 minutes prior to the remainder of the flight. Had he completed his required one FMLP period he would have been on deck 11 hours after reporting for work, well within the framework of a maximum 12 hour day established by the Commanding Officer. The Board feels that, in spite of the inconsistencies of deck time and aircraft availability, the schedule should not reflect a working day in excess of 12 hours for any one pilot, RP or IP. Consideration must also be given to the types of flights flown if more than one is scheduled.

(b) Although there is no established policy on the subject it is an accepted practice on the part of most squadrons to direct that an aircraft, after a primary flight instrument failure, be flown in day VFR conditions before being scheduled for a night/instrument flight after corrective actions has been taken. The practice is sound and should be adopted in the squadron although it was not a factor in this accident.

PART VIII

CONCLUSIONS

The Board concludes that:

1. The aircraft was mechanically sound.

2. LTJG BACHMEIER was adequately prepared for the flight.

3. LTJG BACHMEIER unintentionally flew into the ground while in control of his aircraft.

4. LTJG BACHMEIER died instantly on impact with no ejection attempted.

5. The primary cause of the accident was pilot error in that LTJG BACHMEIER allowed his instrument/visual scan to break down at a point where an accelerated scan was demanded.

6. Possible causes of the scan breakdown are:
   (a) Searching for interval and their relative movement
   (b) Distraction caused by communications traffic
   (c) Fatigue

PART IX

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Board Recommends that:

1. The daily Flight Schedule be closely monitored to preclude the possibility of pilot fatigue through either the length of the working day or the complexity of scheduled events.

2. A firm Maintenance Department Policy be adopted prohibiting night or Instrument Flight prior to a day/VFR flight in an aircraft which has undergone work for correction or a primary flight instrument discrepancy.

3. The importance of maintaining an instrument scan during night flights under VFR conditions cannot be overstressed. Pilots must be constantly reminded that they are subject to fatal error in a fatigue condition and should not fly if in doubt.

LIST OF ENCLOSURES

1. Copy of VA-122 Flight Schedule for 6 May 1969
2. Copy of Tower Tape Transcription
3. Statement of LT (b) (6) , LSO
4. Statement of (b) (6) , AC2, Control Tower Operator
5. Statement of (b) (6) , Civilian Crash Crew Operator
6. Statement of (b) (6) , AN, A3 crewman
7. Photograph of crash site and witness locations
8. Photograph of initial impact point
9. Photograph of wreckage (overhead)
10. Wreckage diagram
11. Photograph of wreckage showing mid fuselage, fwd fuselage and engine
12. Statement of LTJG (b) (6) , A7 pilot
13. Fire/Rescue report
14. 5 year summary of pilot experience
15. Medical Officer's Report

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ATTACK SQUADRON ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO
U. S. N... IR STATION
LE..., CALIFORNIA

FLIGHT SCHEDULE
CDO: LCDR [redacted]
OD: (1)LT [redacted] (2)LT DOW
... LCDR ...

TUESDAY, 6 ... 69
SUNRISE: 0603
SUNSET: 1751

(1) 0730-1845 (2) ...

0800-... MAINTENANCE DIVISION ... MEETING.
0800-1000 ... GROUND SCHOOL ... FOR CLASS 3-69A PLUS CDR [redacted] LCDRS [redacted]
[redacted] LTS [redacted]

0800-1000	FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS	(PF-7)	LT [redacted]
1000-1130	SAFETY, SURVIVAL EQUIP.	(PF-3)	LT
1130-1230	LUNCH		
1230-1530	EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	(PF-6)	LT
1530-1600	NATOPS REVIEW		LT

1000-SECURE LCDR [redacted] REPORT TO VA-127 FOR NATOPS/STANDARDIZATION TEST AND CHECK HOP.
1200-1600 W.O.D...J., BLDG. 004 (W...), FOR CLASS 2-69 AND LTJG [redacted]
1300-1600 T-28 GROUND SCHOOL ... PLANNING ROOM. FOR CDR [redacted] LCDRS [redacted]
[redacted] LTS [redacted]. BY LT [redacted]

OPT/WST SCHEDULE

0730-0900	[redacted]	WST-2	1200-1400	LT [redacted] LCDR [redacted]
0900-1000	VA-93	OPT-		STANDARDIZATION/NATOPS CHECK
1000-1200	VA-56	OPT-5	1630-1800	[redacted] WST-1

W.O.D. DESCRIBE THE FUNCTION OF THE ENGINE ANTI-ICE SYSTEM.
CODE 1 ... K 104 STA 3; ... 1 D STA. 6; ... CP 741 SYS; IP 30,000; P/U 23,700. CONTACT ... TOWER 340.2 ... A-16; TGT ... 341.0; CALL AS "..." ...

NO	A/C T/M	LS	BRIEF STD ETA	ALT/FL	MISSION	STE POPU	MODEX	PILOT	FUEL	TIME	CH	STD/ETA	IFAR CODE
1.	3/A-7		0630 0830 1030		1A1 PTT-2	2+00	...	[redacted]	8000#	1.7 1.7 1.7	19	... * CAPTIVE SIDEWINDER	5A 1A 1A
2.	1/A-7		0800 0900 1030		1A2 F.C.F.	1+30	...		8000#	1.5	17	...	5L
3.	1/T-28		0800 0900 1100		1A4	2+00	...	[redacted] ..., LT. 667 ...	3+30	2.2	16	... DD-175 TO FIL, RETURN	5G
4.	901 2/A-7	420	1015 1215 1500	240 260	1A... CS 3/ ...	2+45 2+15	...	[redacted]	9500# 11500#	1.0 — 1 1K 104	20	... NOTE 1 TOT 1405	5 1
5.	2/A-7		1030 1230 1500		1A2 PUR-3	2+30	...	[redacted]	9500#	1.2 1.2	20	/	5A 1A
6.	1/T-28		1530 1630 1730		1A4	1+00	...	[redacted]	3+30	2.2	16	... DD-175 TO NGZ, RETURN	5G
7.	2/A-7		1500 1700 1930		1A2 PUR-3	2+30	...	[redacted]	9500#	2.2 2.2	20	...	5 1
8.	1/TA-4		1500 1700		1A1 PTT-3	2+00	...	[redacted]	8400#	1.7	18	... * CAPTIVE	5A
	1/A-7		1900				...		8000#	1.2		SIDEWINDER	1A
9.	1/TA-4		1500 1700		1A1 PTT-1	2+00	...		8400#	1.7	19	... * CAPTIVE	5
	1/A-7		1900				...		8000#	1.6		SIDEWINDER	1
10.	2/A-7		1830 2030 2245		3A2 PFI-5	2+15	...		8000#	2.3 2.3	18	...	5 1
11.	2/A-7		1900 2100 2315		3A2 PFI-5	2+15	...		8000#	...	19	...	5 1
12.	8/A-7		0100 0155 0600		3A3 FCLP	0+50	...	[redacted] ... BACHMEIER [redacted]	6000#	0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 ... 0.3 —	17	... FCLP 0200-0600 LSO: FOLEY HEALD HOT SEATS AS NECESSARY	1A 1A 1A 1A 1A 1 1 1

A-7 SYLLABUS SORTIES SCHEDULED 23 FLOWN ... A-7 TEST SORTIES SCHED. 1 FLOWN ...
A-4 SORTIES SCHEDULED 2 FLOWN 2 T-28 SORTIES SCHEDULED 2 FLOWN 2
SUBMITTED: ... APPROVED: ...

Special Handling Required in Accordance with OPNAVINST ...

ENCLOSURE (1)

[illegible] DAILY FLIGHT SCHEDULE

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	PILOT	FUEL	TIME	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[redacted]	8000#	1.9	[illegible]	5L
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible] fuel	2.8	[illegible]	

A-7 SYLLABUS HOURS
SCHEDULED 410 FLOWN 22.7

A-7 TEST HOURS
SCHEDULED 1.5 FLOWN 39

A-7 HOURS SCHED: ________ T-28 HOURS SCHED: ________
A-7 HOURS FLOWN: ________ T-28 HOURS FLOWN: ________
A-7 SORTIES SCHED: ________ T-28 SORTIES SCHED: ________
A-7 SORTIES FLOWN: ________ T-28 SORTIES FLOWN: ________
A-7 SORTIES LOSS WX: ________ T-28 SORTIES LOSS WX: ________
NIGHT HOURS SCHED: ________ NIGHT HOURS FLOWN ________

Operations Duty Officer shall add totals and deliver to Squadron's Schedules Office upon completion of flight ops. The completed Master Schedule shall then be retained for a period of six months by the Operations Dept. following its perusal by the Commanding Officer.

ENCLOSURE (1)

Special Handling Required in Accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

TRANSCRIPTION OF VOICE RECORDING

FACILITY PREPARING TRANSCRIPTION: Lemoore Radar Air Traffic Control Center

SUBJECT: Radio Communications concerning accident of November Juliett 209, A-7, VA-122 of 7 May 1969.

DATE AND TIME COVERED BY TRANSCRIPTION: 7 May 1969, 0116½ to 0129 Local

AGENCIES MAKING TRANSCRIPTIONS:	ABBREVIATION:
1. NJ 209	209
2. Lemoore Tower	Tower
3. 102, A-3	102
4. VA-122 LSO	LSO
5. NE 305	305
6. NJ 278	278

CERTIFICATION:

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the following is a true transcription of the recorded conversation pertaining to the subject accident.

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted] CDR, USN

RATCC OFFICER

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Enclosure (2)

TIME	AGENCY	TRANSCRIPTION
0116½	209	Tower, November Juliett 209's at Westhaven.
	Tower	209 call the Break, the runway lights are off. Flight Deck's on.
	209	09.
	102	PADDLES, here we are again, high Ball, we're inside, we followed your instructions.
	LSO	Roger.
	Tower	102 Tower, what's your speed around the pattern?
	102	Say again.
	Tower	What's your speed around the pattern?
	102	whatever you want it to be, what do you want?
	Tower	I just wanted to make sure that the A-7 is compensated.
	102	About a hundred and thirty.
118½	Tower	209 your interval is 10 o'clock, low, downwind, an A-3, cleared downwind on him.
	209	209 Roger.
	209	09's Breaking.
	Tower	09 Roger Left Break approved.
0120	102	Paddles 102 Skywarior Ball, 74.
	LSO	Roger Ball.
0120½	209	209's at the 180, Pilot Bachmeier.
	LSO	Roger.
0120:3/4	LSO	Ok 209 let's get your lights set up there and you'r too wide abeam.
	209	09.
	102	102 Downwind.
0121	Tower	Interval's at the 180.
	LSO	Light's bright and steady 09.
0121½	209	209's Clara.
	LSO	Roger you'r angling in, keep flying over to the center line.
	209	Roger, Ball.
0121:3/4	209	09's waving off
	LSO	Start your turn.
0122	Tower	09 interval 9 o'clock.
	209	09 Roger.
	102	102 Skywarrior Ball, seven thousand.

TIME	AGENCY	TRANSMISSION
	LSO	Roger Ball.
		Garbled Transmission.
0124	209	09 Corsair Ball, Six Zero.
	LSO	Roger Ball.
0124½	LSO	Going low.
	NE 305	Lemoore Tower NE 305 Westhaven with two for FCLP's.
	Tower	305 and flight report the Break for 32L, your number one reported to the break, runway lights are off, Flight Decks on.
	305	05
	LSO	102 Paddles
	LSO	Roger 102 Paddles.
	102	Go Ahead.
	LSO	Roger, time to make a correction for that fast start is early in the approach so that you don't get that decell all the way down in close.
	102	Roger.
0125:3/4	NJ 278	Lemoore Tower November Juliett 278 Westhaven, flight of two, FCLP's.
	Tower	278 call the Break, Flight deck's on, runway lights are off.
	778	78 Roger.
	Tower	305 your interval is approaching the 180, downwind at your 10 o'clock, Left Break approved on him. Number 3 & 4.
	305	05
	102	Paddles, 102, Skywarior Ball, 6 point 8.
	LSO	Roger Ball.
	LSO	Ok you'r a little low, you need to come left for line up.
	LSO	Attitude.
0127	Tower	102 your interval breaking 12 o'clock high upwind.
	102	02.
	102	I appreciate the interest there paddles but that was one hell of a late wave-off. I touched down anyway.
	LSO	Roger, you hit the Ramp for the second time in a row, How about flying the glide slope with power and airspeed with the nose sothat it would get on the glide slope with a set up early.

TIME	AGENCY	TRANSMISSION
	102	I'm trying Paddles, I'm not asleep up here, I'm just telling you that's a hell of a late wave-off.
0127½	LSO	Roger, I know it.
	209	209 Corsair Ball 58
	LSO	Roger Ball.
	Tower	278 Your interval's 12 o'clock upwind.
	278	78 Roger.
	Tower	An A-3.
0127:3/4	305	305, 180 gear down, 62, Finderup
	Tower	209 your flight, correction, your traffic a flight of two, breaking upwind A7's.
0128¼	LSO.	At the 180 check your altitude.
0128¼	Tower	Crash, Crash.
	Tower	Paddles, Tower, wave everything off, Delta the Pattern.
	LSO	Roger, all aircraft in the Pattern, Pattern Delta.

Statement of [redacted], LT, USNR, [redacted] LSO, concerning VA-122 aircraft accident 15-69A, A7A, BUNO 152664 occurring 7 May 1969, pilot BACHMEIER

On the night of 6 May 1969 at approximately 2400 hours, I briefed LTJG BACHMEIER, plus the other replacement pilots in the class, on night FMLP procedures. Reference was the VA-122 LSO briefing guide and topics discussed included the following:

1. Night Lighting-aircraft & field lighting
2. Carrier Deck Lighting
   a. Feeling of being high with no other visual peripheral aids
3. Pattern Techniques
   a. Same as day pattern but you can't see
   b. Must fly instruments
4. IFR/VFR Scan
   a. Emphasis was placed on the fact that night MLP flying required maximum pilot skills and attention; Basic instrument scan must include outside of cockpit. Night FMCP demands the maximum of pilot effort.

At approximately 0045 7 May 1969, I arrived at the LSO platform on runway 32L. Charlie time was 0100. I was informed by LTJG [redacted] VA-27 LSO, that a KA3 was in the pattern and desired MLP. I told him he could work the A3 until the A7's filled the pattern.

At approximately 0115, LTJG BACHMEIER entered the pattern via the break. He was the first A7 in the pattern along with the A3. On his first pass he undershot the runway, abandoned the approach and made a low pass flying up the runway. My comment was: OWO-PATT. His second pass was well set up and he flew the ball and touched down long. My comment: B→RUF P TMPIC B. His third and final pass was recorded: B→OCP LO FIC BAR.

While LTJG BACHMEIER was making his third pass, two more A7's entered the break. About 10-15 seconds after NJ 209 lifted, the other LSO told me to check the 180. I did, observed an aircraft appearing to be low and transmitted, "At the 180, check your altitude". At that moment I saw a flash of light and heard the tower say, "Crash, crash". My conversation with the tower after that is as follows:

Me: Tower, paddles, what aircraft was that ?
Tower: 209 sir
Me: Did you observe an ejection sequence ?
Tower: No sir
Me: What happened?
Tower: I don't know sir. He climbed to pattern altitude then dove into the ground.

I then left the platform and went to the crash site.

I believe that looking west, i.e., towards the downwind leg, the cockpit visibility would necessitate IFR flight.

I have been a designated Naval Aviator since 26 October 1965, and have a total of 1314 flight hours, 117 hours in the A7 aircraft. I have 2 years experience as an LSO.

[redacted]

Enclosure (3)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of [redacted] AC2,USN, [redacted], concerning VA-122 aircraft accident 15-69A, involving A7A BUNO 152664, pilot BACHMEIER

I was monitoring the MLP pattern on runway 32L on the morning of 7 May 1969. I saw NJ 209 climb from his touch and go, reach pattern altitude, and suddenly nose over and dive into the ground abeam the first high speed turn-off north of the CPN-4 site. The aircraft was in a wings level attitude during the entire time.

I yelled "crash, crash!" on the air, AC2 [redacted] activated the crash phone, and the hardstand truck, 32L rolled all about the same time.

The aircraft exploded on impact. I did not see the pilot attempt to pull the aircraft out of it's dive just prior to impact, I saw no ejection sequence, and I did not notice any change to indicate the plane had flamed out.

I did not really realize something was wrong until it was too late. Everything appeared so normal that it wasn't until just before impact that I saw that the pilot was not going to pull out. Even when the aircraft nosed over in it's dive, the angle of descent was not unusually steep so as to cause immediate alarm. Judging from the impact point next to the runway, the pilot had not started his turn crosswind.

I have been a Tower Controller five years and hold a FAA Senior rating for the Lemoore area.

[redacted] AC2

[redacted]

Enclosure (4)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of R. L. BASSET, civilian, NAS Crash Crew Operator, GS-3, concerning VA-122 aircraft accident 15-69A, A7A, BUNO 152664, pilot BACHMEIER

On May the 7th, 1969, at approximately 0130, I was observing MLP's on runway 32L when the A-7 in question crashed.

The aircraft made his touchdown and was started back up when I seemed to notice a change in sound of the aircraft as if he were throttling back. At this time he leveled out and started to descend.

I was standing outside of the assigned truck. I turned to run for my truck and upon entering I looked up to see him touch down and the aircraft catch fire and skid to a stop.

R L Basset

R. L. BASSET

This Board considers R. L. BASSET a credible witness.

Enclosure (5)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of (b) (6) AN, USN B (b) (6) concerning VA-122 aircraft accident 15-69A, involving A7A BUNO 152664, which occurred on 7 May 1969, pilot BACHMEIER

On the morning of May 7 at about 0130 I was standing at VA-125 hot refuel pit when I witnessed the crash of an A-7 on the left runway 32 L.

Our aircraft, an KA-3B/B was in the MLP pattern at the time and was due in for refueling. Our aircraft was making his approach when two A-7s flew over the numbers and broke downwind. Following that our aircraft bounced, climbed to altitude and turned downwind. Then two more A-7s followed our aircraft. When our aircraft got to about the 180, the first A-7 was at this time descending to the runway. This is about 200 feet. At about 50 to 100 feet the A-7 added power but was still descending fairly fast. On impact there was a burst of flame. It was not an explosion. I could see the outline of the aircraft because of the flame. It looked to me as though the plane was in a left skid and on impact, it looked as though either the right main mount tire blew or the gear collapsed. Then the plane went into a cartwheel down the runway for about 1000 to 2000 feet. About three fourths of the way down his wings were separated from the aircraft. The flame was following the plane down the runway. Then there was a large explosion.

To the best of my knowledge this statement is true.

I have been in the Navy for two years and five months and have been associated with aircraft every since. I have been an aircrewman for 13 months now. I have made two cruises to WESTPAC, the first with spads and the second with the A-3.

(b) (6)

This Board considers (b) (6) a credible witness.

Certified True Copy

(b) (6)

Enclosure (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES


PHOTOGRAPH OF CRASH SITE AND WITNESS LOCATIONS


ENCLOSURE (8) TO VA-122 AAR SER 15-69A BUNO 152664 PILOT BACHMEIER
PHOTOGRAPH OF INITIAL IMPACT POINT
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES


ENCLOSURE (2) TO VA-122 LTR
PHOTOGRAPH OF
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED



VA-122 AAR 15-69A
WRECKAGE DIAGRAM

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 5750.6 SERIES ENCL (10)

ENCLOSURE (11) TO VA-122 AAR SER 15-69A BUNO 152664 PILOT BACHMEIER
PHOTOGRAPH OF WRECKAGE SHOWING MID FUSELAGE, FWD FUSELAGE AND ENGINE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of [redacted], LTJG, USN, [redacted] concerning aircraft accident 15-69A, A7A, BUNO 152664 occurring 7 May 1969, pilot BACHMEIER

On the night of the accident my wingman, LTJG [redacted], USNR, and I had taken off at 0100 in order to burn down to FMLP landing weight. We circled the field and entered at Westhaven initial for entry into FMLP pattern about 0125. The runway lights were turned off and only the carrier deck lights were on making runway line-up a problem coming in from initial, since it was also a very dark night. I made a gentle wide turn from Westhaven to runway heading and used two aircraft for line-up, one was an A-3 approaching the ramp, and the other aircraft LTJG James BACHMEIER was flying which was approaching the "in the middle" portion of the glide slope.

As I assumed the proper line-up the A-3 was receiving a wave-off from the LSO and then began to garbage up the air with miscellaneous chatter, words to the effect that the LSO had given him a bad wave-off since he touched down anyway and besides he was taking or initiating his own wave-off to begin with. This chatter continued until he turned crosswind to take interval on the section which broke ahead of my section. It was then that I over flew LTJG BACHMEIER and was waiting for my interval on the A-3 who seemed to be somewhere way above pattern altitude and just below break altitude to commence my break.

It was during this wait for my interval that the LSO called my side number low at the 180 and I responded "Negative 278's at the break". The tower then proceeded to call interval either for LTJG BACHMEIER or aircraft coming from the initial. It was then that I looked into my mirrors and the only aircraft I could see was LTJG BACHMEIER. He seemed to be making an approach or finishing the final portion of the glide slope which he had commenced when I passed overhead. As it turned out he had already made his touch and go and when I caught sight of him in my mirrors he was going down immediately prior to the crash. Since all the runway lights were out I couldn't tell how far down the runway he was and just assumed he was finishing his approach and it was then that I saw a small bright flash just prior to my break. As I broke the fireball erupted and somebody shouted "Crash, crash, crash... ... which aircraft was that?...Answer. 209". I was in my crosswind turn just prior to putting down gear and could directly see the fireball and the plane erupt in a long line as the aircraft was skidding forward on the ground. Shortly thereafter we were first told to Delta and then Bingo to 32 right. Some of the aircraft in the pattern made downwind entries to 32 right and I went back out to the Hall's corner initial and landed.

I have been a designated Naval Aviator since ~~7 July 1969~~ 24 AUG 1968. I have a total of 389 flight hours, 82 hours in the A7 aircraft.

[redacted]

Enclosure (12)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Bachweiler 5-7-69

AIRCRAFT FIRE/RESCUE REPORT

BUWEPS FORM 11135/1 (9-60)

NO TRANSMITTAL LETTER REQUIRED

REPORT SYMBOL BUWEPS 11135-1

STATION AND LOCATION	DATE OF REPORT	AFRR NO.
Naval Air Station Lemoore, California	5-7-69	06-69
	DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT: 5-7-69 - 0128	ON STATION: X / OFF STATION:
REPORTING CUSTODIAN: VA-122	MODEL AIRCRAFT INVOLVED: A7A	BUREAU NO.: 152664

TO: Commander N.A.S.C. (AIR-4232)

VIA: MILITARY COMMAND: COMFAIRALAMEDA; SIGN: (b) (6) [redacted]

EXACT LOCATION OF INCIDENT: Approximately 7300 Ft from approach end of 32L

TYPE OF INCIDENT								FIRE INVOLVED		ESTIMATED CASE
TAKE-OFF		LINE OR LOADING		FUELING				YES	X	
LANDING	X	PARKED		MAINTENANCE				NO		
TAXIING		DEFUELING		INFLIGHT				IMPACT IGNITION	X	
OTHER (Specify)								DELAYED IGNITION		

CONDITIONS AT TIME OF INCIDENT

GENERAL WEATHER PICTURE		NATURE OF TERRAIN AT AND IN APPROACH TO INCIDENT
Hi scattered - visibility 12 miles	WIND DIRECTION: 300° T	Concrete Runway
	WIND VELOCITY (mph): 2 Knots	
	TEMPERATURE (°F): 54°	

LIQUID FUEL QUANTITY

		OTHER FUELS
ESTIMATED ON BOARD BEFORE INCIDENT (lbs)	6000 lbs	
ESTIMATED ON BOARD AFTER INCIDENT (lbs)	none	
ESTIMATED SPILL AREA (Size in feet)	75' by 300' slide area (approx)	

PERSONNEL RESCUE

NO. PERSONNEL ON BOARD AIRCRAFT	1
NO. PERSONNEL SURVIVED	0
NO. PERSONNEL ESCAPED UNAIDED	0
NO. PERSONNEL RESCUED	0

DESCRIBE RESCUE METHODS USED: None - Pilot was thrown from aircraft at time of crash - did not survive.

FIRE FIGHTING

FIRST METHOD OF ALARM USED							TIME RECORD	
TWO-WAY RADIO		EMERGENCY INTER-COM.		EMERGENCY PHONE	X		TIME ALARM RECEIVED	0128
OTHER METHOD (State)							TIME EQUIPMENT ARRIVED	0129

STATION EQUIPMENT

EACH EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE AT INCIDENT		NO. PERSONNEL MANNING EQUIPMENT		QUANTITY EXTINGUISHING AGENTS USED	
TYPE	NO. LOADS USED	MIL.	CIV.	FOAM (gals. conc. used)	OTHER TYPES AND QUANTITIES
2 MB-1		3	6	95 Gal Foam	1800 Gal Water
1 MB-5		1	3	20 Gal Light H2O	600 Gal Water
1 Nurse T.		-	2	-	1800 Gal Water
1 Runway Foamer		-	2	-	1400 Gal Water
1 F. E.		-	2	-	
2 P/U					

STATION EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE

TYPE	DEFICIENCY	NO. OF DAYS	EXPLAIN DELAYS TO REPAIR
	None		

FULL DESCRIPTION OF FIREFIGHTING OR PROTECTION AT INCIDENT

0128 Notified via primary Emergency Crash Phone stating A-7 Crash on 32-L. All crash equipment responded.

0128 Secondary Phone stated same.

0129 Hardstand truck at scene.

0130 All other crash equipment at scene.

0141 MB-1 Lemoore 8 reported that pilots body had been found.

0201 All crash equipment secured excepting Nurse Truck, 1 MB-1, F. E. and Pick-up remained at scene as precautionary standby and cleanup.

0230 All crash equipment in quarters from scene.

DIAGRAM OF INCIDENT SHOWING WIND, DIRECTION, APPROACH OF EQUIPMENT, POSITION OF AIRCRAFT, DISTANCES, ETC.
(Maps and photographs should be included, if significant)



DESCRIPTION OF DIFFICULTIES IN FIRE CONTROL AND EXTINGUISHMENT DUE TO UNUSUAL CONDITIONS OR EQUIPMENT AND/OR AGENT INADEQUACIES

None

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN EQUIPMENT AND/OR PROCEDURES TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY

None

MONETARY LOSSES (Estimated)

PERCENT DAMAGE BY IMPACT	PERCENT DAMAGE BY FIRE	LOSS TO SURROUNDING PROPERTY
100%		None

DATE	PREPARED BY (Name and title)	SIGNATURE
5-7-69	(b) (6) Platoon Captain	(b) (6)
5-7-69	Platoon Capt	
DATE	STATION COMMANDING OFFICER	SIGNATURE
5/9/69	L. B. CORNELL, Captain, USN	L. B. Cornell

LTJG J. F. BACHMEIER's RESUME OF FLIGHT EXPERIENCE

COMMAND ATTACHED	PERIOD ASSIGNED	MODEL AIRCRAFT	FLIGHT HOURS	CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	OPERATIONAL/ PROFICIENCY
VT-7	JUN 67-JUL 67	T-34	27.6	0/0	OPERATIONAL
VT-4	AUG 67-MAR 68	T2A/B	123.5	4/0	OPERATIONAL
VT-24	APR 68-AUG 68	AF9J/TF9J	137.5	6/0	OPERATIONAL
(VA-127 A/C VA-122	NOV 68-MAY 69	TA4F	29.2	0/0	OPERATIONAL
VA-122	NOV 68-MAY 69	T28B	2.0	0/0	OPERATIONAL
VA-122	NOV 68-MAY 69	A7A/B	82.0	0/0	OPERATIONAL

ENCLOSURE (14)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
IDENTIFICATION, FLIGHT AND NARRATIVE DATA
OPNAV FORM 3750/8A (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-8101

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7

See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

I. IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity)	2. MOR NUMBER	3. DAMAGE CODE
ATKRON 122, NAVAL AIR STATION, LEMOORE, CALIFORNIA 93245	15-69A	ALFA

4. TYPE OF MISHAP	5. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	6. DATE	7. MODEL A/C	8. BUNO
[XX] ACCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT [ ] INCIDENT	ONE	7 MAY 69	A-7A	152664

9. MODEL OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED	10. BUNO	11. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	12. DAMAGE CODE
NONE	NA	NA	NA

13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED (Use Additional Sheets if Required) NAME (Last, First and Middle Initial)	14. RANK/RATE	15. BRANCH OF SERVICE	16. DUTY BILLET	17. INJURY CODE	18. DISPOSITION
PILOT AT CONTROLS AT TIME OF MISHAP A. BACHMEIER, James Florian	LTJG	USN	Replacement Pilot	A	F
CO-PILOT B.					
C.					
D.					

II. FLIGHT DATA *(At Time of Emergency)*

1. TERRAIN CLEARANCE	2. CABIN ALTITUDE	3. TIME AT CABIN ALTITUDE	4. AMBIENT ALTITUDE	5. TIME AT AMBIENT ALTITUDE
zero FEET	235 FEET	0 HOURS 17 sec.	235 FEET	0 HOURS 17 sec.

6. PLACE IN FORMATION
[ ] A - SINGLE AIRCRAFT
[ ] L - LEAD
[ ] W - WING
Y - OTHER (SPECIFY) Night mirror landing pattern -- 6 aircraft.

8. HORIZON
[ ] 1 - DISTINCT
[ ] 2 - OBSCURED
8 - OTHER (SPECIFY) Night -- no visible horizon.

7. CLOUD CONDITIONS
[ ] 0 - CLEAR
[X] 1 - OVERCAST Thin cloud layer.
[ ] 2 - UNDERCAST
[ ] 3 - IN CLOUDS
[ ] 4 - IN AND OUT OF CLOUDS
8 - OTHER (SPECIFY) _____

9. DURATION OF FLIGHT
HOURS 0 MIN. 17

III. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP *(Continue on Reverse Side if necessary)*

LTJG James Florian BACHMEIER, III was a fleet replacement pilot with VA-122 who had 400 total flight hours and 82 A-7 hours, having completed all of the A-7 syllabus except night mirror landing practice, carrier qualifications, and three advanced syllabus flights.

He launched directly into the night mirror landing practice pattern from runway 32 Right at 0111T 7 MAY, 1969. Initial fuel quantity on board was 8,100 lbs. necessitating a climb to 6,000 feet to dump fuel to 6,000 lbs. to be at maximum fuel weight for his first mirror landing. Preflight, start and take-off had all been normal. At 0116½ LTJG BACHMEIER called the initial point to 32 Left (the primary night mirror landing practice runway.) He was told that runway lights were off and "deck lights" were on. LTJG BACHMEIER's first pass was improper, angling in and he took a technique wave-off. This can be partially attributed to runway lights being off causing difficulty with runway line-up. The LSO states that LTJG BACHMEIER looked a little "shaky" on this pass. The pattern was a "mixed" pattern at this time containing an A-3, 2 A-7's and expecting the arrival of more A-7's to fill the pattern.

At 0124 LTJG BACHMEIER called the ball on his second pass and completed a "touch-and-go." Again, he looked unsure. The pattern was becoming hectic at this time.

At 0127½ LTJG BACHMEIER called the ball on his third pass. He was noted to touch down, add full power and climb. He was given his interval, by the tower, as "flight of 2 A-7's breaking upwind" as he lifted off. These aircraft were at 1700 feet. LTJG BACHMEIER climbed, reduced power to 89% and transitioned into a nose down attitude, instead of level flight, at 265 feet AGL. Pattern altitude is 450 feet AGL. He was noted to fly nearly wings level, into the ground impacting at 0128. No ejection attempt was observed. The plane exploded and burned violently on impact. The pilot was thrown from the aircraft and came to rest just short of the cockpit in the fireball. No power loss, explosions, fires or violent maneuvers of the aircraft were noted prior to impact.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C [illegible]DENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
MEDICAL INFORMATION
OPNAV FORM 3750/8B (REV. 4-68) S/N-0107-731-8201

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

1. DEGREE OF INJURY

- [ ] 1 - NONE
- [ ] 2 - MINOR
- [ ] 3 - MAJOR
- [X] 4 - FATAL
- [ ] 5 - MISSING, LAND
- [ ] 6 - MISSING, WATER
- [ ] 7 - MISSING, UNKNOWN

2. DAYS HOSPITALIZED: Dead on arrival
3. DAYS IN QUARTERS: N/A
4. DAYS GROUNDED: N/A
5. UNCONSCIOUS: on ground HOURS impact MIN.

8a. DISPOSITION: F

8b. EXPOSURE: [ ] 1 - MILD [ ] 2 - MODERATE [X] 3 - SEVERE

8c. SHOCK: Death [ ] 1 - MILD [ ] 2 - MODERATE [ ] 3 - SEVERE

9. INJURIES INCURRED DURING MISHAP
(Use Standard DOD Terminology for Body Part, Diagnosis and Cause of Injury.) (See DDDC, NAVMED P5082.)

		LEAVE THESE COLUMNS BLANK
A. BODY PART	[redacted]	P
DIAGNOSIS:		D
CAUSE:		C
B. BODY PART		P
DIAGNOSIS:		D
CAUSE:		C
C. BODY PART		P
DIAGNOSIS:		D
CAUSE:		C
D. BODY PART		P
DIAGNOSIS:		D
CAUSE:		C
E. BODY PART		P
DIAGNOSIS:		D
CAUSE:		C

7. LABORATORY TESTS

LABORATORY TESTS	A. TISSUE TESTED	B. METHOD USED	C. LABORATORY COMPLETED	D. RESULT
CARBON MONOXIDE	All body fluids and tissues		sent to AFIP for analysis.	
ALCOHOL				
LACTIC ACID				
OTHER (SPECIFY)				

8. X-RAY RESULTS: [X] CHECK IF PERFORMED. SUBMIT RESULTS ON SEPARATE SHEET. See Enclosure (9)

9. DISEASES/DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF MISHAP

DIAGNOSIS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY: ANNUAL PHYSICAL	SICK CALL	AUTOPSY	OTHER	WAIVERS (AS APPLICABLE): AUTHORITY	DATE
None						

10. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY:

- [X] M - MILITARY PATHOLOGIST
- [ ] C - CIVILIAN PATHOLOGIST
- [ ] PROTOCOL ATTACHED
- [X] F - FLIGHT SURGEON
- [ ] Y - OTHER
- [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

11. MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO AFIP:

- [X] 1 - AUTOPSY REPORT
- [X] 2 - FROZEN TISSUE
- [X] 3 - PICTURES
- [X] 4 - FIXED TISSUE

12. LIST ADDITIONAL INJURIES RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF THE MISHAP, AND ADD ANY PERTINENT REMARKS

See Autopsy report (enclosure 8) and x-ray reports (enclosure 9) for complete listings of injuries.

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BuNO
BACHMEIER, James F. Jr.	[redacted]	A-7A	152664

C-31418

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
OPNAV FORM 3750/8C (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-721-6301

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section II of OPNAVINST 3750.6

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete on all occupants of aircraft, all injured persons, and all persons possibly contributing to the cause of the mishap. Supervisory factors attributed to persons not in the aircraft and such factors as design or weather should be reported only for the person in primary control of the aircraft. Factors contributing to injury during mid-air collisions, crash landings, ditchings, etc., are to be considered part of survival phase. Use codes at right to show only those factors present or contributing in each phase.

PHASES OF MISHAP
A – Accident
E – Escape
S – Survival (includes parachute landings)
R – Rescue

FACTOR IMPORTANCE
D – Definitely contributed
S – Suspected factor
P – Condition present but did not contribute to accident or injury

FACTORS		A	E	S	R
1. SUPERVISORY FACTORS					
A. INADEQUATE BRIEFING	101				
B. ORDERED/LED ON FLIGHT BEYOND CAPABILITY	102				
C. POOR CREW COORDINATION	103				
D. OTHER (SPECIFY)	199				
2. PRE-FLIGHT FACTORS					
A. FAULTY FLIGHT PLAN	201				
B. FAULTY PRE-FLIGHT OF AIRCRAFT	202				
C. FAULTY PREPARATION OF PERSONAL EQUIPMENT	203				
D. HURRIED DEPARTURE	204				
E. DELAYED DEPARTURE	205				
F. INADEQUATE WEATHER ANALYSIS	206				
G. OTHER (SPECIFY)	299				
3. EXPERIENCE/TRAINING FACTORS					
A. INADEQUATE TRANSITION	301				
B. LIMITED TOTAL EXPERIENCE	302	S			
C. LIMITED RECENT EXPERIENCE	303				
D. FAILURE TO USE ACCEPTED PROCEDURES	304				
E. OTHER (SPECIFY)	399				
4. DESIGN FACTORS					
A. DESIGN OF INSTRUMENTS, CONTROLS	401				
B. LOCATION OF INSTRUMENTS, CONTROLS	402				
C. FAILURE OF INSTRUMENTS, CONTROLS	403				
D. COCKPIT LIGHTING	404				
E. RUNWAY LIGHTING	405				
F. LIGHTING OF OTHER AIRCRAFT	406				
G. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE	407				
H. WORKSPACE INCOMPATIBLE WITH MAN	408				
I. OTHER (SPECIFY)	499				
5. COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS					
A. MISINTERPRETED COMMUNICATIONS	501				
B. DISRUPTED COMMUNICATIONS	502				
C. LANGUAGE BARRIER	503				
D. NOISE INTERFERENCE	504				
E. OTHER (SPECIFY)	599				
6. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS					
A. FOOD POISONING	601				
B. MOTION SICKNESS	602				
C. OTHER ACUTE ILLNESS	603				
D. OTHER PRE-EXISTING DISEASE/DEFECT	604				
E. GET-HOMEITIS	605				
F. HANGOVER	606				
G. SLEEP DEPRIVATION	607				
H. FATIGUE, OTHER	608	S			
I. MISSED MEALS	609				
J. DRUGS PRESCRIBED BY MEDICAL OFFICER	610				
K. DRUGS, OTHER	611				
L. ALCOHOL	612				
M. VISUAL ILLUSIONS	613	S			
N. UNCONSCIOUSNESS	614				
O. DISORIENTATION/VERTIGO	615				
P. HYPOXIA	616				
Q. HYPERVENTILATION	617				
R. DYSBARISM	618				
S. CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING	619				
T. BOREDOM	620				
U. INATTENTION	621	S			
V. CHANNELIZED ATTENTION	622				
W. DISTRACTION	623	S			
X. PREOCCUPATION WITH PERSONAL PROBLEMS	624				
Y. EXCESSIVE MOTIVATION TO SUCCEED	625				
Z - OVERCONFIDENCE	626				
AA. LACK OF SELF-CONFIDENCE	627				
BB. LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN EQUIPMENT	628				
CC. APPREHENSION	629	S			
DD. PANIC	630				
EE. OTHER (SPECIFY)	699				
7. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS					
A. ACCELERATION FORCES, IN-FLIGHT	701				
B. ACCELERATION FORCES, IMPACT	702		D	D	
C. DECOMPRESSION	703				
D. VIBRATION	704				
E. GLARE	705				
F. SMOKE, FUMES, ETC.	706				
G. HEAT	707				
H. COLD	708				
I. WINDBLAST	709				
J. VISIBILITY RESTRICTION-WEATHER, HAZE, DARKNESS	710	S			
K. VISIBILITY RESTRICTION-ICING, WINDOWS FOGGED, ETC.	711				
L. VISIBILITY RESTRICTION-DUST, SMOKE, ETC. IN ACFT	712				
M. WEATHER, OTHER THAN VISIBILITY RESTRICTION	713				
N. OTHER (SPECIFY)	799				
8. OTHER FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED					
A. HABIT INTERFERENCE; USED WRONG CONTROL	801				
B. CONFUSION OF CONTROLS, OTHER	802				
C. MISREAD INSTRUMENT(S)	803				
D. MISINTERPRETED INSTRUMENT READING	804				

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
BACHMEIER, James P. Jr.	(b) (6)	A-7A	152664

FACTORS		A	F	S	R
8. OTHER FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED (Cont.)					
E. MISLEAD BY FAULTY INSTRUMENTS	805				
F. VISUAL RESTRICTION BY EQUIPMENT STRUCTURES	806				
G. TASK OVERSATURATION	807				
H. INADEQUATE COORDINATION OR TIMING	808				
I. MISJUDGED SPEED OR DISTANCE	809				
J. SELECTED WRONG COURSE OF ACTION	810				

FACTORS		A	F	S	R
K. DELAY IN TAKING NECESSARY ACTION	811	D			
L. VIOLATION OF FLIGHT DISCIPLINE	812				
M. NAVIGATIONAL ERROR	813				
N. INADVERTENT OPERATION, SELF-INDUCED	814				
O. INADVERTENT OPERATION, MECHANICALLY INDUCED	815				
P. OTHER (SPECIFY)	899				

REMARKS: *(Indicate item and describe circumstances in detail as necessary.)*

3B: 400 total flight hours, 82 A-7 hours, 16.1 night hours previous 3 months; first night mirror landing carrier practice.

6H: Very demanding afternoon flight. Continuously awake 15½ hours without real rest.

6M: Dark night, runway not lighted (deck lighting only for night mirror landing practice - therefore no ready ground reference). Doing night VFR/IFR flight. A/C at 265 feet (BACHMEIER) taking interval on flight. Two A-7's breaking overhead at 1700 feet - visual illusion of climbing causing pilot to transition to descending attitude.

6U: Night IFR/VFR flight. Scan probably broke down and pilot did not read altimeter.

6W: Taking interval on 2 A/C breaking overhead - possibly gazed at them too long causing instrument scan to break down.

6CC: First night mirror landing practice - would be apprehensive.

7B: Violent ground impact and A/C explosion precluded escape attempt or survival.

7J: Dark night - no ground reference - no horizon.

8K: Delay in taking attention off A/C breaking overhead and resuming instrument scan. Did not transition to nose up attitude in time to avoid ground impact (if at all).

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C [illegible]DENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
PERSONAL DATA
OPNAV FORM 3750/5D (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-721-6401

I. CONTRIBUTING EFFECT

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

I. ROLE OF THIS INDIVIDUAL IN THE CAUSE OF THE MISHAP:

A. PRIMARY: [X] 1. DEFINITE [ ] 2. PROBABLE [ ] 3. POSSIBLE
B. CONTRIBUTING: [ ] 4. DEFINITE [ ] 5. PROBABLE [ ] 6. POSSIBLE [ ] 8. NONE [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

II. BACKGROUND *(Complete for all pilots and others who possibly contributed to mishap)*

A. DATE LAST LEAVE ENDED: 4 Jan 1969
B. DAYS DURATION LAST LEAVE: 13 days
C. TYPE OF LEAVE LAST TAKEN: [X] 1. ORDINARY [ ] 2. EMERGENCY [ ] 3. REENLISTMENT [ ] 4. GRADUATION [ ] 5. SICK OR CONVALESCENT [ ] 6. DELAY ENROUTE [ ] 9. UNKNOWN
D. DATE OF LAST PREVIOUS FLIGHT: 7 May 1969
E. IN LAST 24 HOURS (HOURS AND MINUTES FLOWN): 2 MIN. 29
F. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 2 MIN. 29
G. IN LAST 24 HOURS (MISSIONS FLOWN): 2
H. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 2
I. IN LAST 24 HOURS (HOURS AND MINUTES WORKED): 5 MIN. 28
J. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 5 MIN. 28
K. IN LAST 24 HOURS (HOURS SLEPT): 7
L. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 18 1/2
M. CONTINUOUS DUTY PRIOR TO MISHAP: HOURS 1 MIN. 28
N. HOURS CONTINUOUSLY AWAKE PRIOR TO MISHAP: 15
O. DURATION OF LAST SLEEP PERIOD: HOURS 7 MIN. 0
P. TIME IN COCKPIT PRIOR TO FLIGHT: 0 HOURS 10 MIN.

III. PHYSIOLOGICAL, LOW PRESSURE CHAMBER AND VERTIGO TRAINING *(For all personnel)*

TYPE TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED	PLACE TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETED Month	COMPLETED Year	ROLE* IN MISHAP
PHYSIOLOGICAL	NAS Lemoore	Sept	68	0
Low Pressure Chamber	NAS Lemoore	Sept	68	0
Vertigo	NAS Lemoore	Sept	68	4

*For role in mishap, use following code:
0 – NO IMPORTANCE
1 – TRAINING DEFINITELY HELPED
2 – TRAINING POSSIBLY HELPED
3 – LACK OF TRAINING DEFINITELY A FACTOR
4 – LACK OF TRAINING POSSIBLY A FACTOR
9 – UNKNOWN

IV. ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA

a. DATE OF BIRTH: (b) (6)
b. HEIGHT: (b) (6) INCHES
c. WEIGHT: (b) (6) POUNDS
d. SITTING HEIGHT: (b) (6) INCHES
e. TRUNK HEIGHT: (b) (6) INCHES
f. FUNCTIONAL REACH: INCHES
g. BUTTOCK–KNEE LENGTH: INCHES
h. LEG LENGTH: INCHES
i. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID): INCHES

V. GENERAL

1. NUMBER AND TYPE OF PRIOR MISHAPS *(Complete for all pilots, navigators, and/or other persons on board of aircraft)*
a. No. None b. DESCRIBE TYPE(S):

2. TOTAL YEARS OF FORMAL EDUCATION: 16

3. CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES OF PREVIOUS 72 HOURS *(For all pilots, navigators, and/or persons possibly contributing to mishap)*

See Following Attached Sheets.

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
BACHMEIER, James F. Jr.	(b) (6)	A-7A	152664

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES OF PILOT JAMES FLORIAN BACHMEIER, III FOR 72 HOURS PRECEEDING THE ACCIDENT.

SUNDAY, 4 MAY, 1969

0130 - 0830 Sleeping soundly. Had out-of-town house guests for the week-end, relaxed but probably some added burden.

0830 - 0930 Arose, showered, dressed etc.; noted to really "take his time" and be happy and relaxed.

0930 - 0945 Relaxing with house guests.

0945 - 1020 Breakfast of fried bacon, fried potatoes, scrambled eggs, English muffins, orange juice and milk.

1020 - 1100 Going to Catholic Mass.

1100 - 1200 Attended Mass and received communion.

1200 - 1315 Trying to help wife calm down fussy baby. Anxious due to possibly missing the Air Show at NAS Lemoore that day. (Quite a tense situation.)

1315 - 1330 Taking baby (they have one 6-week-old child) to the babysitter.

1330 - 1345 Driving to NAS for Air Show.

1345 - 1400 Back gate to NAS Lemoore closed. LTJG BACHMEIER very angry about delay, the wife was angry that Jim was angry and a heated argument ensued.

1400 - 1500 Driving all the way around to the front gate (21 miles) angry and arguing. Argument settled.

1500 - 1800 At Lemoore NAS Air Show, now relatively relaxed and enjoying the show.

1800 - 2100 Drove home, retrieved child from babysitter, invited friends over and had social get-together. Ate portion of pizza and had one or two beers.

2100 - 2300 Wife sleeping on couch, Jim reading and watching T.V. (All harmonious by this time -- family situation.)

2300 - 1300 Sound, relatively uninterrupted sleep. (Yes, he slept until 1 PM.)

MONDAY, 5 MAY, 1969

1300 - 1400 Arose, showered, shaved and dressed in a leisurely fashion.

1400 - 1415 Consumed several hot dogs and buns; beans, potato chips and milk.

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES OF PILOT JAMES FLORIAN BACHMEIER, III FOR 72 HOURS PRECEEDING THE ACCIDENT. (Continued:)

MONDAY, 5MAY, 1969 (Continued:)

1415 - 1600 Working around the house, drove to Post Office and visited with LCDR (b) (6) for awhile.

1600 - 1630 Driving to Hanford with friends to have dinner.

1630 - 1800 Had 2-3 beers before dinner, relaxing and visiting.

1800 - 1930 Large dinner of ice tea, BBQ steak, potato salad and tossed salad. Jim was noted to be in excellent spirits and to eat heartily.

1930 - 2130 Played two hands of bridge; then watched L.A.-BOSTON basketball game on T.V. while eating cheese cake.

2130 - 2200 Driving home with wife. Noted to feel great, excellent spirits, no ills or problems apparent.

2200 - 2300 Relaxing at home and talking to wife.

2300 - 2400 Went to bed with wife, couldn't sleep so arose again when wife fell asleep.

TUESDAY, 6 MAY, 1969

2400 - 0130 Reading and relaxing and trying to become tired enough to go to bed and sleep. (All the reading in this 72 hour statement is apparently flight preparations.)

0130 - 0830 Sleep, interrupted briefly at 0330-0400 by crying child.

0830 - 0900 Awake -- in bed with wife (b) (6) (b) (6)

0900 - 1000 Arose with wife, shaved, showered, dressed in leisurely fashion.

1000 - 1030 Hearty breakfast of orange juice, milk, French toast and bacon.

1030 - 1300 Working around house and washing the car and watching the baby outside while washing the car, etc.

1300 - 1330 Dressed and got ready for work. No dinner that day due to large, late breakfast.

1330 - 1500 Left for work, stopped to see LCDR (b) (6) for awhile.

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES OF PILOT JAMES FLORIAN BACHMEIER, III FOR 72 HOURS PRECEEDING THE ACCIDENT. (Continued)

TUESDAY, 6 MAY 1969 (Continued)

1500-1545 Noted to be in ready room in full flight gear at 1500. Brief lasted 1500-1545 for PNR-3 flight with IP chase LCDR (b) (6) (b) (6) This is a low level, hooded, full systems navigation flight at 1,000 feet AGL going in valley and near ridges. It is the most difficult flight in the syllabus. It is noted to be very anxiety provoking for all. Requires much preparation and study. The brief was thorough and complete. LTJG BACHMEIER was "ready and up" for the flight.

1545-1610 Checking out aircraft, preflight, etc.

1610-1618 Manned aircraft and prepared for take-off.

1618-1830 Flew the above mentioned very difficult PNR-3 flight (2.2 flight hours.) Flew with the added burden of an improper ASN-50 gyro (the ADI) which malfunctioned. Completed the hop, doing well, despite this malfunction. Please note this gyro failure. (Afternoon before accident.)

1830-1900 De-briefed the hop. Noted to be exhuberant, happy and in apparent excellent health. Very proud to have completed the "graduation hop" of the syllabus under very adverse (but safe) conditions.

1900-1930 Getting out of flight gear and driving home.

1930-2000 Told wife he was pleased, happy and proud of the afternoon flight. He and his wife played with the 6-week-old baby.

2000-2030 Had dinner of spagetti, stew, tossed salad and baking powder biscuits. Ate very well - was exhuberant.

2030- Trying to relax and read in the living room while wife cleaned kitchen and called LCDR (b) (6) for ride to squadron.

2030-2330 Trying to relax - trying to sleep in preparation for night flight. In the words of his wife, "Oh hell, he couldn't sleep knowing he was going to have to get up again to fly."

2330-2350 Riding to squadron with LCDR (b) (6). Spoke only of the difficult afternoon hop. Noted to be very proud of it and very "pumped up" (words of LCDR (b) (6) about afternoon hop and flying in general- did not even mention the upcoming night flying (his first night mirror landing carrier practice.)

2350-2400 Getting into flight gear.

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES OF PILOT JAMES FLORIAN BACHMEIER, III FOR 72 HOURS PRECEEDING THE ACCIDENT. (Continued)

WEDNESDAY, 7 MAY 1969

2400-0025 Relaxing in ready room and "shooting the breeze."

0025-0040 Refresher brief on night mirror landing practice. The extensive (greater than two hours and thorough) brief had been held several drys prior to this and was thought to be very adequate by all pilots briefed.

0040-0100 Checking out aircraft, preflight, etc., manning aircraft and taxi - all normal according to plane captain questioned.

0111 Take-off.

0116½ BACHMEIER reaches the initial to 32 Left, the primary mirror landing runway.

0119 BACHMEIER calls the break.

0120¼ Pilot, BACHMEIER, at the 180 - three other aircraft in the pattern at this time.

0120-3/4 LSO tells pilot, BACHMEIER, to illuminate his aircraft properly and that he is wide abeam.

0121½ Pilot, BACHMEIER, calls the ball "Clara" told by LSO he is angling in.

0121-3/4 Pilot, BACHMEIER, waves off (technique) noted to be "shaky" on this pass.

0124 Pilot, BACHMEIER, calls ball on second pass.

0124½ Called by LSO for being low. Two more aircraft call at the initial point at this time. During all this BACHMEIER flight time, the two LSO's are talking to an A-3 in the pattern who is having near extreme difficulty; they are trying to instruct him.

0126-0127½ LSO and A-3 engaged in verbal radio battle. (Nearly all A-3, little from LSO.)

0127½ Pilot, BACHMEIER, calls the ball on his third pass.

0127-3/4 Tower gives pilot BACHMEIER who has touched-down and climbed to 150-200 feet his interval as "flight of two breaking upwind A-7's." Tower operator notes pilot BACHMEIER climb to 265 feet, level off and gently arch down to ground impact - calling "Crash" just prior to the impact and again just after impact.

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES OF PILOT JAMES FLORIAN BACHMEIER, III 72 HOURS PRECEEDING THE ACCIDENT. (Continued)

WEDNESDAY, 7 MAY 1969 Continued:

0128½ Tower operator calls, "Crash, crash!" as both LSO's are watching and instructing aircraft who appears to be low (he was actually wide) at the 180.

0128½ Ground impact - no ejection attempt, no survival; plane explodes on impact. Pilot thrown from aircraft and burned severely where he impacted in intense fire near cockpit.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
PERSONAL, SURVIVAL AND ESCAPE EQUIPMENT
OPNAV FORM 3750/8E (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-721-0501

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

NOMENCLATURE AND MODEL DESIGNATION	REQUIRED	AVAILABLE	USED	NEEDED	PROBLEMS *Indicate by code from list on reverse side.*
1. CLOTHING (MAYS, HEADGEAR, SHOES, GLOVES, VISOR, UNDERWEAR, ETC.)					
Flight Suit (Nomex)	Y	AE	AE	AE	09
Helment APH - 6	Y	A	A	AE	09
Flight Gloves (Nomex)	Y	N	N	Y	03 not worn in cockpit
Helment Face Visor (tinted/clear)	Y	A	A	AE	09
Flight Boots (steel toe)	Y	AE	AE	AES	09
Anti G Suit (MK-2A)	Y	AE	A	AE	09
2. OXYGEN MASK A-13 A	Y	A	A	AES	04, 07
3. OXYGEN REGULATOR Robert-Shaw-Fulton	Y	A	A	A	09
4. LIFE VEST None	N	N	N	N	not required this flight
5. LIFE RAFT PK-2	Y	A	N	N	09
6. SURVIVAL RADIO(S) None	Y	N	N	N	01 none in squadron
7. SIGNALLING DEVICES					
SEEK-2 Kit	Y	A	N	N	09
Strobe Light	N	A	N	N	09
Pencil Flares	N	A	N	N	09
8. SURVIVAL KIT (CONTAINER) RSSK-8A	Y	A	N	N	09
9. OTHER SURVIVAL GEAR					
Survival Knife	Y	A	N	N	08
SV-2 Survival Vest (complete)	N	AE	N	N	09
10. RESTRAINTS (LAP BELTS, SHOULDER HARNESS, LEG RESTRAINTS)					
Torso Harness MA-2 Cutaway	Y	AE	A	AE	09
11. PARACHUTE-TYPE NB-10	Y	AE	A	AE	09
12. PARACHUTE CANOPY RELEASE Koch Fittings	Y	AE	N	AE	09
13. PARACHUTE OPENING/DEPLOYMENT DEVICES 1000-D	Y	AE	N	AE	09
14. SEAT TYPE ESCAPAK 1-C2	Y	A	N	AE	09
15. OTHER (SPECIFY)					
16. EXPLAIN PROBLEMS (USE REVERSE SIDE IF NECESSARY)					

All evidence points to the pilot not recognizing his danger and flying into the ground unaware of his difficulties. Egress consisted of being thrown from wreckage. Killed instantly on ground impact - essentially no survival or rescue phase.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
BACHMEIER, James F. Jr.	(b) (6)	A-7A	152664

01 - NOT AVAILABLE-SUPPLY PROBLEM
02 - NOT AVAILABLE-LEFT BEHIND
03 - DISCARDED
04 - LOST
05 - DAMAGED-MINOR
06 - DAMAGED-MAJOR
07 - BURNED-MINOR
08 - BURNED-MAJOR
09 - DESTROYED BY EXTREME FORCE/FIRE
10 - FAILED TO OPERATE (RADIO, ACTUATOR, ETC.)
11 - OPERATED PARTIALLY
12 - DIFFICULTY LOCATING
13 - BEYOND REACH
14 - CONNECTION/CLOSURE DIFFICULTY
15 - CONNECTION/CLOSURE FAILURE
16 - RELEASE/DISCONNECT DIFFICULTY
17 - RELEASE/DISCONNECT FAILURE
18 - INADVERTENT RELEASE/DISCONNECT
19 - INADVERTENT ACTUATION
20 - ACTUATION DIFFICULTY
21 - ACTUATION FAILURE
22 - ACTUATED BY OTHER PERSON
23 - RESTRAINT/ATTACHMENT INADEQUACY
24 - RESTRAINTS/ATTACHMENTS NOT USED PROPERLY FOR MAXIMUM PROTECTION
25 - IMPROPER USE (OTHER)
26 - UNFAMILIAR WITH USE
27 - COLD HAMPERED USE
28 - INJURY HAMPERED USE
29 - WATER HAMPERED USE
30 - OTHER EQUIPMENT INTERFERED
31 - DONNING/REMOVAL PROBLEM
32 - DISCOMFORT/BULKINESS
33 - POOR FIT
34 - LEAKED
35 - MATERIEL DEFICIENCY
36 - DESIGN DEFICIENCY
37 - HANGUP/ENTANGLEMENT (WITH A/C OR OTHER EQUIPMENT)
38 - ENTANGLEMENT (PARACHUTE SUSPENSION LINES ONLY)-MAJOR
39 - ENTANGLEMENT (PARACHUTE SUSPENSION LINES ONLY)-MINOR
40 - DRAGGING (PARACHUTE ONLY)
41 - NON-STANDARD CONFIGURATION
42 - AIDED IN LOCATION/RESCUE
43 - NOT EFFECTIVE IN LOCATION/RESCUE (USED IN AREA OF SAR VEHICLES)
44 - PREVENTED/MINIMIZED INJURY
45 - EQUIPMENT PROBLEM (LOSS, FAILURE, ETC.) A FACTOR IN PRODUCING INJURY
46 - EQUIPMENT PRODUCED INJURY (HIT BY EJECTION SEAT, ETC.)
47 - FAILURE/DELAY IN USING COMPROMISED SURVIVAL/RESCUE
48 - ALL CREW EQUIPMENT (CODE ONLY ONCE)
49 - MAINTENANCE/INSTALLATION ERROR
50 - PROBLEM EXPERIENCED BY OTHERS IN ACTUATION/RELEASE OF EQUIPMENT
51 - EQUIPMENT DAMAGE-SELF INDUCED
52 - EQUIPMENT FAILURE-SELF INDUCED
60 - OTHER (SPECIFY)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
ESCAPE - EGRESS COMPLETE FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS
OPNAV FORM 3750/5P (Rev. 4-68) S/N 0107-721-8601

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section II of OPNAVINST 3750.6

1. LOCATION IN AIRCRAFT

A
- [X] 1. COCKPIT OR PILOT'S COMPARTMENT
- [ ] 2. NAVIGATOR'S/ENGINEER'S COMPARTMENT
- [ ] 3. PASSENGERS' COMPARTMENT (SINGLE DECK)
- [ ] 4. PASSENGERS' COMPARTMENT (UPPER DECK)
- [ ] 5. PASSENGERS' COMPARTMENT (LOWER DECK)
- [ ] 6. OTHER COMPARTMENT
- [ ] 9. COMPARTMENT UNKNOWN

B. LONGITUDINAL LOCATION
- [X] 1. FORWARD SECTION
- [ ] 2. CENTER SECTION
- [ ] 3. AFT SECTION
- [ ] 4. SECTION UNKNOWN

C. LATERAL LOCATION
- [X] 2. CENTER
- [ ] 4. LEFT SIDE
- [ ] 5. RIGHT SIDE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

D. DIRECTION FACING
- [X] 1. FORWARD
- [ ] 2. AFT
- [ ] 3. SIDEWARD
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

E. USE OF SEAT
- [ ] 0 NOT IN SEAT
- [X] 1. IN SEAT
- [ ] 2. BUNK/LITTER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

2. METHOD OF ESCAPE *(More than one may apply)*

A. EJECTION
- [ ] 1. ACCOMPLISHED (FREE OF AIRCRAFT)
- [ ] 2. ATTEMPTED (NOT ACCOMPLISHED)
- [ ] 3. SEAT EJECTED ON IMPACT (TERRAIN)
- [ ] 4. INADVERTENT EJECTION
- [X] 7. UNKNOWN IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE Probably not.
- [ ] 8. SUSPECTED EJECTION
- [ ] 0. DEFINITELY NOT ATTEMPTED

B. BAILOUT
- [ ] 1. ACCOMPLISHED (FREE OF AIRCRAFT)
- [ ] 2. ATTEMPTED (NOT ACCOMPLISHED)
- [ ] 3. BAILED OUT AFTER EJECTION ATTEMPT FAILED
- [ ] 7. UNKNOWN IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE
- [ ] 8. SUSPECTED BAILOUT
- [X] 0. DEFINITELY NOT ATTEMPTED

C. OTHER
- [ ] A. STANDARD EMERGENCY GROUND EGRESS
- [ ] 1. UNDERWATER EGRESS (NOT EJECTION)
- [ ] 3. DID NOT ESCAPE
- [ ] 4. EXIT UNASSISTED (OTHER THAN STANDARD EMERG. GROUND EGRESS)
- [ ] 5. CARRIED/ASSISTED OUT
- [X] 6. BLOWN/THROWN OUT
- [ ] 7. JUMPED FROM A/C (AIRBORNE)
- [ ] 8. UNKNOWN IF ESCAPE ACCOMPLISHED
- [ ] 9. ESCAPED, METHOD UNKNOWN

3. INTENT FOR ESCAPE
- [ ] 1. INTENTIONAL
- [X] 3. UNINTENTIONAL, MECHANICAL
- [ ] 2. UNINTENTIONAL, SELF INDUCED
- [ ] 4. INTENT UNKNOWN

4. EXIT USED
- [ ] 1. NORMAL EXIT
- [X] 8. OTHER
- [ ] 2. EJECTED THROUGH CANOPY
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN
- [ ] 3. EMERGENCY EXIT Thrown out by tremendous ground impact forces.

5. COCKPIT/CABIN CONDITION AFTER IMPACT
- [ ] 0. NO DAMAGE (OTHER THAN CANOPY LOSS, ETC.)
- [ ] 1. MINOR DAMAGE (DEFINITELY HABITABLE)
- [ ] 2. REASONABLY INTACT (PROBABLY HABITABLE)
- [ ] 3. MAJOR DAMAGE (PROBABLY NOT HABITABLE)
- [X] 4. DESTROYED (DEFINITELY NOT HABITABLE)
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

6. ORDER OF ESCAPE *(1st, 2nd, etc.)* Single

7. REASON(S) FOR ESCAPE *(More than one may apply)*
- [ ] A. FIRE/EXPLOSION/SMOKE
- [ ] G. WATER IMPACT
- [ ] B. LOSS OF CONTROL
- [X] H. GROUND/STRUCTURE IMPACT
- [ ] C. ENGINE FAILURE
- [ ] J. LAUNCH FAILURE
- [ ] D. FUEL EXHAUSTION
- [ ] K. ARRESTMENT FAILURE
- [ ] E. STRUCTURAL FAILURE
- [ ] Y. OTHER
- [ ] F. MID-AIR COLLISION
- [ ] Z. UNKNOWN

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
BACHMEIER, James F. Jr.	(b) (6) [redacted]	A-7A	152664

8. COMMUNICATIONS PRIOR TO ESCAPE

- [ ] 1. DISTRESS SIGNAL TRANSMITTED
- [ ] 2. POSITION FIX TRANSMITTED
- [ ] 3. EMERGENCY IFF (MANUAL)
- [ ] 4. EMERGENCY IFF (AUTOMATIC)
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN
- [X] 8. NONE

9. NUMBER OF PREVIOUS:

EJECTIONS 0 EMERGENCY BAILOUTS 0

OTHER PARACHUTE JUMPS (TRAINING, SKYDIVING, ETC.) 0

10. TERRAIN OF PARACHUTE LANDING OR CRASH SITE

(More than one may be applicable) Thrown out of aircraft.

- [ ] A - OPEN SEA
- [ ] B - LARGE LAKE
- [ ] C - RIVER
- [ ] D - DEEP WATER, OTHER
- [ ] E - SHALLOW WATER
- [ ] F - DEEP SNOW
- [ ] G - THICK ICE
- [ ] H - MARSH/SWAMP/MUD
- [ ] U - HARD GROUND
- [ ] J - SOFT GROUND
- [ ] K - BUILDING
- [ ] L - FLIGHT DECK
- [ ] M - DENSE WOODS
- [ ] N - IN TREES
- [ ] T - THROUGH TREES
- [ ] P - RAVINE/STEEP SLOPE
- [ ] Q - ROCKS
- [ ] R - IN/NEAR FIREBALL
- [ ] S - DESERT
- [ ] Y - UNKNOWN
- [ ] Z - OTHER _____

11. AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE AT TIME OF ESCAPE

(Either in flight or after crash, ditching, etc.)

- [ ] NOSE UP
- [ ] NOSE DOWN 5 DEGREES
- [X] RIGHT BANK 10°
- [ ] LEFT BANK _____ DEGREES
- [ ] A. NOSE DOWN SPIN
- [X] F. DISINTEGRATION
- [ ] B. FLAT SPIN
- [ ] G. INVERTED
- [ ] C. OSCILLATING SPIN
- [ ] H. MUSHING
- [ ] D. ROLLING
- [ ] Z. UNKNOWN
- [ ] E. TUMBLING
- [ ] Y. OTHER (DESCRIBE) _____

12. EJECTION SEAT/PARACHUTE TRAINING

(Not required for passengers who had no opportunity to escape)

TYPE OF TRAINING	TOTAL HOURS IN TRAINING	DATE OF LAST TRAINING	ROLE*
LECTURES/DEMONSTRATIONS	10	SEP 68	0
TRAINING FILMS	6	SEP 68	0
UNARMED EJECTION SEAT	2	SEP 68	0
ARMED SEAT ON TOWER	30 min.	SEP 68	0
JUMP SCHOOL	None		
PARASAIL TRAINING	None		
OTHER (SPECIFY)			

**Use codes below to indicate role training played in this mishap.*

0 - NO IMPORTANCE
1 - TRAINING DEFINITE HELP
2 - TRAINING POSSIBLE HELP
3 - LACK OF TRAINING FACTOR
4 - LACK OF TRAINING POSSIBLE FACTOR
9 - TRAINING ROLE UNKNOWN

13. EGRESS DIFFICULTIES *(Place X in appropriate column)*

B - Before; D - During; A - After No attempt made. Thrown from aircraft by ground impact.

		GROUND B	GROUND D	GROUND A	WATER B	WATER D	WATER A	AIR B	AIR D	AIR A
1. BUFFETING	01									
2. G FORCES	02									
3. WINDBLAST	03									
4. SEAT PINS NOT REMOVED	04									
5. DIFFICULTY LOCATING CANOPY JETTISON MECHANISM	05									
6. HAMPERED BY CLOTHING	06									
7. HAMPERED BY EQUIPMENT (INCLUDE BODY ARMOR)	07									
8. HAMPERED BY INJURIES	08									
9. DIFFICULTY RELEASING CANOPY/HATCH	09									
10. FAILURE TO RELEASE CANOPY/HATCH	10									
11. DIFFICULTY LOCATING/REACHING NORMAL EJECTION MECHANISM	11									
12. DIFFICULTY LOCATING/REACHING ALTERNATE EJECTION MECHANISM	12									
13. FACE CURTAIN FAILED TO ACTIVATE SEAT	13									
14. FACE CURTAIN PROBLEM (LOCATING, REACHING, ETC.)	14									
15. SEAT PAN FIRING HANDLE FAILED TO ACTIVATE SEAT	15									
16. SEAT PAN FIRING HANDLE PROBLEM (LOCATING, ETC.)	16									
17. CANOPY JETTISON PROBLEM	17									
18. CANOPY JETTISON FAILURE (AUTOMATIC MEANS)	18									

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

13. EGRESS DIFFICULTIES *(Place X in appropriate column) (Continued)*

B - Before; D - During; A - After

		GROUND				WATER				AIR		
		B	D	A		B	D	A		B	D	A
19. COULD NOT OPEN CANOPY/HATCH	19				19				19			
20. DIFFICULTY RELEASING RESTRAINTS	20				20				20			
21. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-OBSTRUCTIONS	21				21				21			
22. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-INJURIES	22				22				22			
23. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-A/C ATTITUDE	23				23				23			
24. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-EQUIPMENT HANGUP	24				24				24			
25. PINNED DOWN IN A/C (OTHER THAN EQUIPMENT HANGUP)	25				25				25			
26. CONFUSION/PANIC/DISORIENTATION	26				26				26			
27. DARKNESS-NO VISUAL REFERENCE	27	X			27				27			
28. FIRE/SMOKE/FUEL	28				28				28			
29. ANTHROPOMETRIC PROBLEM	29				29				29			
30. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT FACTOR (OTHER THAN HANGUP)	30				30				30			
31. UPPER EXTREMITIES HIT COCKPIT STRUCTURES	31				31				31			
32. LOWER EXTREMITIES HIT COCKPIT STRUCTURES	32				32				32			
33. MAN STRUCK CANOPY/CANOPY BOW	33				33				33			
34. STRUCK EXTERNAL SURFACE OF AIRCRAFT	34				34				34			
35. FLAILING - UPPER EXTREMITIES	35				35				35			
36. FLAILING - LOWER EXTREMITIES	36				36				36			
37. DROGUE SLUG SWINGING AT MAN	37				37				37			
38. DROGUE SLUG STRUCK MAN	38				38				38			
39. MAN STRUCK BY OTHER EQUIPMENT	39				39				39			
40. MAN STRUCK BY SEAT	40				40				40			
41. SEAT SEPARATION DIFFICULTY	41				41				41			
42. SEAT/PARACHUTE ENTANGLEMENT	42				42				42			
43. MAN TANGLED IN CHUTE RISERS-MAJOR	43				43				43			
44. MAN TANGLED IN CHUTE RISERS-MINOR	44				44				44			
45. PARACHUTE LINE O\ ER	45				45				45			
46. MAN HELD ON TO SEAT	46				46				46			
47. TUMBLING/SPINNING	47				47				47			
48. PARACHUTE DID NOT OPEN	48				48				48			
49. PARACHUTE STREAMED	49				49				49			
50. INADVERTENT OPENING OF LAP BELT	50				50				50			
51. FAILURE OF LAP BELT TO OPEN	51				51				51			
52. INRUSHING WATER	52				52				52			
53. COLD	53				53				53			
54. UNCONSCIOUS/DAZED	54				54				54			
55. OTHER	55				55				55			

REMARKS OR CONTINUATION: *(Index each remark with code from above)*

All evidence points to the pilot not recognizing his difficulty and making no attempt at ejection. He was thrown a short distance free of the aircraft by tremendous ground impact forces. The pilot, with all safety/survival gear, demolished and very severely burned, impacted just short of the cockpit area.

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
BACHMEIER, James F. Jr.	(b) (6)	A-7A	152664

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT EJECTION OR BAILOUT
OPNAV FORM 3750/8G (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-8701

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section II of OPNAVINST 3750.6

(Complete for all inflight escapes and ejections)

1. TIME FROM EMERGENCY UNTIL ESCAPE ATTEMPT WAS INITIATED
HOURS 0 MINUTES 0 SECONDS 0

2. DELAY IN INITIATING ESCAPE DUE TO: No escape attempted

- [ ] 1. ATTEMPTING TO OVERCOME PROBLEM
- [ ] 2. AVOIDING POPULATED AREA
- [ ] 3. AVOIDING UNSUITABLE TERRAIN
- [ ] 4. GAINING ALTITUDE
- [ ] 5. LOSING ALTITUDE
- [ ] 6. LOSING AIRSPEED
- [x] 8. OTHER Didn't recognise problem
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

3. TERRAIN CLEARANCE AT TIME OF: No ejection

A. 1. ESCAPE (FEET) Zero 2. PARACHUTE OPENING (FEET) None
B. 1. AIRSPEED AT TIME OF ESCAPE None KIAS
2. GROUND/FORWARD SPEED (IF NOT AIRBORNE) 145 K
C. [ ] 1. PARACHUTE DID NOT OPEN [ ] 2. PARACHUTE STREAMED

4. PROTECTIVE HELMET:

	CHIN STRAP FASTENED YES	NO	UNK	HELMET VISOR LOWERED YES	NO	UNK
1. BEFORE EMERGENCY	[ ]	[ ]	[x]	[x]	[ ]	[ ]
2. DURING EGRESS	[ ]	[ ]	[x]	[x]	[ ]	[ ]
3. DURING CHUTE LANDING	[ ]	[ ]	[x]	[ ]	[x]	[ ]
4. CHIN STRAP FASTENED SNUGLY ?				[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
5. NAPE STRAP FASTENED SNUGLY ?				[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

5. ZERO LANYARD:

A. WHEN CONNECTED
- [ ] 0. AVAILABLE, NOT CONNECTED
- [x] 1. PRIOR TO EMERGENCY
- [ ] 2. DURING EMERGENCY
- [ ] 3. TIME UNKNOWN
- [ ] 8. NA/NOT AVAILABLE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

B. SURVIVAL FACTOR
- [x] 0. NOT A FACTOR IN SURVIVAL
- [ ] 1. FACTOR IN SURVIVAL
- [ ] 2. NOT A FACTOR IN NON-SURVIVAL
- [ ] 3. FACTOR IN NON-SURVIVAL
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN IF FACTOR

6. AUTOMATIC LAP BELT RELEASE No chance

- [ ] 0. DID NOT OPEN OR RELEASE
- [ ] 1. RELEASED AUTOMATICALLY AS DESIGNED
- [ ] 2. OPENED MANUALLY
- [ ] 3. OPENED INADVERTENTLY
- [ ] 8. UNKNOWN HOW RELEASED
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN IF RELEASED

7. REMOVAL OF AIRCRAFT CANOPY

A. INTENT
- [ ] 1. INTENTIONAL
- [ ] 2. UNINTENTIONAL, SELF-INDUCED
- [x] 3. UNINTENTIONAL, MECHANICAL
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

B. INITIATED BY:
- [ ] 1. THIS INDIVIDUAL
- [ ] 2. ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN Thrown off at impact

7. REMOVAL OF AIRCRAFT CANOPY *(Continued)*

C. REMOVAL
- [ ] 0. DEFINITELY NOT ATTEMPTED
- [x] 1. ACCOMPLISHED Impact
- [ ] 2. ATTEMPTED (UNSUCCESSFUL)
- [ ] 3. UNKNOWN IF ATTEMPTED

D. METHOD
- [ ] 1. ARM REST/LEG BRACE
- [ ] 2. FACE CURTAIN
- [ ] 3. SEAT PAN HANDLE
- [ ] 4. MANUALLY UNLOCKED
- [x] 5. EXTERNAL FORCE Probable impact
- [ ] 6. CANOPY JETTISON HANDLE
- [x] 9. UNKNOWN
- [ ] 8. OTHER (DESCRIBE)

8. EJECTION Evidently not attempted

A. INTENT
- [ ] 1. INTENTIONAL
- [ ] 2. UNINTENTIONAL
- [x] 9. UNKNOWN

B. INITIATED BY
- [ ] 1. THIS PERSON
- [ ] 2. ANOTHER PERSON
- [x] 3. EXTERNAL FORCE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

C. METHOD
- [ ] 1. ARM REST/LEG BRACE
- [ ] 2. FACE CURTAIN
- [ ] 3. SEAT PAN HANDLE
- [ ] 4. SEAT SEQUENCER
- [x] 5. IMPACT
- [ ] 6. FIRE
- [ ] 7. MECHANICAL FAILURE
- [ ] 8. OTHER EXTERNAL FORCE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

9. BODY POSITION AT EJECTION *(As compared to optimal)*
No ejection

		A. HEAD	B. HIPS	C. FEET	D. ELBOWS
OPTIMAL	1				
FORWARD	2				
UPWARD	3				
LATERAL	4				
UNKNOWN	9				

10. POSITION OF EJECTION SEAT
- [ ] 1. FULL UP
- [x] 2. FULL DOWN
- [ ] 3. INTERMEDIATE POSITION
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

11. METHOD OF SEPARATING MAN FROM SEAT
- [ ] 0. DID NOT SEPARATE
- [ ] 1. SEAT SEPARATOR
- [ ] 2. SPONTANEOUS/TUMBLING
- [ ] 3. PUSHED SELF AWAY
- [ ] 4. PERSONNEL PARACHUTE
- [x] 8. OTHER Impact forces
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
BACHMEIER, James F. Jr.	(b) (6)	A-7A	152664

12. TYPE OF SEAT SEPARATION

☐ 0- NONE ☐ 3. PARACHUTE
☐ 1. ROTARY ☐ 4. SNUBBING LANYARD
☐ 2. BLADDER

Impact forces and fire on ground

13. METHODS OF DEPLOYING PARACHUTE

☒ 0. NOT DEPLOYED ☐ 5. STATIC LINE
☐ 1. AUTOMATIC TIMER ☐ 6. MANUAL
☐ 2. ANEROID ☐ 8. OTHER
☐ 3. BALLISTIC DEVICE ☐ 9. UNKNOWN
☐ 4. ZERO LANYARD

14. PARACHUTE OPENING SHOCK None - not activated

☐ 0. NEGLIGIBLE ☐ 3. SEVERE
☐ 1. MODERATE ☐ 9. UNKNOWN

15. OSCILLATIONS	0-NEGLIGIBLE	1-MODERATE	2-SEVERE	9-UNKNOWN
A. DURING DESCENT	No descent			
B. DURING LANDING				

16. PARACHUTE DAMAGE (Give number of)

1. SEVERED SHROUD LINES All destroyed in fire 3. TORN PANELS-MAJOR ____
2. MISSING PANELS ____ 4. TORN PANELS-MINOR ____

17. CAUSE OF PARACHUTE DAMAGE

☐ 1. OPENING SHOCK ☐ 6. IN TREES
☐ 2. FOULED ON EJECTION SEAT ☐ 7. DRAGGING
☐ 3. FOULED ON A/C ☐ 8. OTHER (DESCRIBE)
☐ 4. FIRE ☐ 9. UNKNOWN
☐ 5. ON LANDING

Intense ground fire

18. FOUR LINE CUT DISREGARD, (Air Force Item only)

19. DIRECTION FACED AT CHUTE LANDING No chute landing

☐ 1. DIRECTLY FACING ☐ 4. QUARTERING, BACK
☐ 2. FACING AWAY ☐ 5. DIRECTLY SIDEWAYS
☐ 3. QUARTERING, FACING ☐ 9. UNKNOWN

20. LANDING CONDITIONS

A. TOTAL WEIGHT UNDER PARACHUTE: 210 LBS
B. SURFACE WINDS ____ KNOTS
C. DRAGGED BY CHUTE ☐ 1. YES ☐ 8. NO
D. DISTANCE DRAGGED: ____ YARDS

21. PARACHUTE LANDING POSITION TECHNIQUES None

A.
☐ 8. COULD NOT SEE
☐ 1. LOOKING AHEAD
☐ 2. LOOKING DOWN
☐ 8. OTHER
☐ 9. UNKNOWN

B.
☐ 1. FELL OBLIQUELY
☐ 2. FELL BACKWARD
☐ 3. FELL FORWARD
☐ 8. OTHER
☐ 9. UNKNOWN

C.
☐ 1. MUSCLES TENSED
☐ 2. MUSCLES TOO TENSE
☐ 3. TOO RELAXED
☐ 8. OTHER
☐ 9. UNKNOWN

D.
☐ 1. PROPER POSITION
☐ 2. KNEES LOCKED
☐ 3. ARMS IN POOR POSITION
☐ 8. OTHER
☐ 9. UNKNOWN

22. DEPLOYED BEFORE LANDING None

	1 - YES	0 - NO	9 - UNKNOWN
A. SURVIVAL KIT		X	
B. LIFE RAFT		X	
C. LIFE VEST		X	

23. CANOPY DEFLATION POCKETS

☐ 0. NOT EFFECTIVE IN COLLAPSING CHUTE
☐ 1. AIDED IN COLLAPSING CHUTE
☐ 7. NOT INSTALLED
☐ 8. UNKNOWN IF INSTALLED
☐ 9. UNKNOWN IF EFFECTIVE

Chute didn't open

REMARKS: No ejection, no bailout, no parachute deployment, no survival.

Pilot thrown from aircraft on impact and (b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]

0-51884

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
SURVIVAL AND RESCUE
OPNAV FORM 3750/5H (REV. 8-68) S/N 0107-721-6000

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section II of OPNAVINST 3750.6

1. SURVIVAL TRAINING

Use Code at right to indicate the role this person's training played in survival.

0 - NOT A FACTOR
1 - DEFINITELY HELPED
2 - POSSIBLY HELPED
3 - LACK OF TRAINING DEFINITE FACTOR
4 - LACK OF TRAINING POSSIBLE FACTOR
9 - ROLE UNKNOWN

	TYPE TRAINING	COURSE AND SPONSOR	PLACE ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETED Month	COMPLETED Year	*ROLE
A.	WATER SURVIVAL: 1. MAINTENANCE DUTIES	NAS Lemoore	NAS Lemoore	Aug	68	0
	2. GILBERT DUNKER	USNAVSCOLAVMED	Pensacola, Florida	Aug	67	0
	3. PARACHUTE DRAG	USNAVSCOLAVMED	Pensacola, Florida	Aug	67	0
	4. IMMERSED COCKPIT	None				0
	5. IMMERSED SEAT	None				0
B.	JUNGLE SURVIVAL	None				0
C.	ARCTIC SURVIVAL	None				0
D.	DESERT SURVIVAL	None				0
E.	MOUNTAIN SURVIVAL	None				0
F.	SURVIVAL (GENERAL)	D WEST Faetupac	San Diego, Calif.	Oct	68	0

2. CONDITIONS PREVAILING AT SURVIVAL/RESCUE SITE *(If widely variable, give range)*

A. WATER TEMPERATURE N/A °F
B. AIR TEMPERATURE 56 °F
C. SURFACE WINDS 0 KNOTS
D. WAVE HEIGHT N/A FEET
E. WAVE FREQUENCY N/A PER MIN.

F. TERRAIN
[X] 1. OPEN GROUND [ ] 2. WATER [ ] 3. WOODS/JUNGLE [ ] 4. ICE/SNOW [ ] 5. MOUNTAINS [ ] 6. SWAMP [ ] 4. DESERT [X] 8. OTHER [ ] 9. UNKNOWN
Beside Runway

G. WEATHER
[X] 1. CLEAR [ ] 2. OVERCAST [ ] 3. FOG [ ] 4. RAIN [ ] 5. SNOW [ ] 6. SLEET [ ] 7. HAIL [X] 8. OTHER [ ] 9. UNKNOWN
Pitch black night

3. TIME LAPSE SEQUENCE FOR RESCUE EVENTS *(Give time lapse in hours and minutes from time of mishap)*

For actual rescue vehicle and personnel and others who took an active part in the rescue sequence but did not actually recover this individual. See Instructions for details.

	ACTUAL	OTHER ASSIST	OTHER ASSIST	LIGHT CONDITIONS Day	Night	Dawn	Dusk
A. RESCUE PERSONNEL NOTIFIED THAT MISHAP HAD OCCURRED	0128	SAR	helo		X		
B. RESCUE VEHICLE DEPARTED	0128+	on standby			X		
C. THIS INDIVIDUAL LOCATED BY RESCUE PERSONNEL	0130				X		
D. THIS INDIVIDUAL PHYSICALLY REACHED BY RESCUE VEHICLE PERSONNEL	0140	Ground	units		X		
E. THIS INDIVIDUAL ACTUALLY ABOARD RESCUE VEHICLE OR RESCUE ATTEMPT ABANDONED	0210	on standby					
F. RESCUE COMPLETED (PERSON RETURNED TO STATION, HOSPITAL, ETC.)	0215						

4. A. TIME THIS INDIVIDUAL SPENT IN WATER None HRS. 0 MIN. B. TIME THIS INDIVIDUAL SPENT IN LIFE RAFT 0 HRS. 0 MIN.

5. AT TIME OF RESCUE ALERT, DISTANCE IN MILES FROM MISHAP SITE TO:
A. ACTUAL RESCUE VEHICLE 1 1/2 miles B. NEAREST ASSIST RESCUE VEHICLE 1 1/2 miles

6. PERSONNEL/VEHICLES PARTICIPATING IN RESCUE

A. VEHICLE PERFORMING ACTUAL RECRUP OF THIS PERSON
1. TYPE/MODEL: Lemoore Ambulance 2. LOCATION WHEN ALERTED Ops Dispensary 3. DUTY WHEN ALERTED SAR

B. DID RESCUE PERSONNEL LEAVE VEHICLE TO ASSIST IN RESCUE? [X] 1. YES [ ] 2. NO [ ] 9. UNKNOWN
IF SO, HOW?
[ ] A. PARACHUTED [ ] C. DESCENDED LINE/LADDER/NET [X] E. NORMAL GROUND/WATER
[ ] B. JUMPED WITHOUT PARACHUTE [ ] D. LOWERED BY HOIST [ ] Y. OTHER

C. LIST OTHER VEHICLES PARTICIPATING IN RESCUE EFFORT: (OTHER ASSISTS IN ITEM 5) MB-5 fire fighting unit
OTHERS WHO STOOD BY READY TO RENDER ASSISTANCE IF REQUIRED: SAR helo, Ground units

D. NUMBER SEARCH AND RESCUE HOURS 47 minutes

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
BACHMEIER, James F. Jr.	(b) (6)	A-7A	152664

7. RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED *(Use numbers to show sequence)*

- [ ] A - SLING
- [ ] B - SEAT
- [ ] C - CARGO NET
- [ ] D - ROPE
- [ ] E - LIFE RING
- [ ] F - BASKET
- [ ] G - BOOM NET
- [ ] H - DAVIT
- [ ] J - RAFT
- [ ] K - WEBBING CUTTERS
- [ ] L - CHICAGO GRIP
- [ ] M - GRAPNEL
- [ ] N - BOARDING LADDER
- [ ] P - KNIFE/AXE/SAW
- [ ] Q - MAKESHIFT CARRIER/SUPPORT
- [ ] R - FIRST AID EQUIPMENT
- [ ] S - TREE PENETRATOR SEAT
- [ ] T - HELICOPTER PLATFORM
- [ ] U - STRETCHER
- [ ] V - CABLE CUTTERS
- [ ] W - HELICOPTER RESCUE BOOM
- [ ] X - BILLY PUGH NET
- [X] Y - OTHER (DESCRIBE) ambulance and stretcher

8. RESCUE ALERTING MEANS *(Use numbers to show sequence)*

- [X] A - WITNESSED
- [ ] B - RADAR SURVEILLANCE
- [ ] C - OVERDUE REPORT TO SAR
- [ ] D - AIRBORNE RAPID RELAY
- [X] E - CRASH PHONE
- [ ] F - OTHER TELEPHONE
- [ ] G - RADIO MAY-DAY CALL
- [ ] H - RADIO SURVIVAL TYPE
- [ ] J - OTHER RADIO REPORT
- [ ] K - VISUAL SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- [ ] L - AUDIO SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- [ ] M - SURVIVOR REPORT
- [ ] N - LOSS OF RADIO CONTACT
- [ ] P - SMOKE/FIRE-CRASH SCENE
- [ ] Y - OTHER (DESCRIBE)

9. ALERTING/COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS None

- [ ] A - POOR RADIO RECEPTION
- [ ] B - TELEPHONE LINE BUSY
- [ ] C - POOR RADIO DISCIPLINE
- [ ] D - AIRCRAFT RADIO/IFF EQUIPMENT INOPERATIVE
- [ ] E - POOR RADIO PROCEDURES
- [ ] Y - OTHER

10. DELAYS IN DEPARTURE OF RESCUE VEHICLES None

- [ ] A - VEHICLE OPERATOR NOT AVAILABLE
- [ ] B - VEHICLE NOT READY
- [ ] C - VEHICLE CREW NOT AVAILABLE
- [ ] D - COMMUNICATIONS BREAKDOWN
- [ ] E - COMPLETING PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED DUTIES
- [ ] F - LACK OF INFORMATION ON CRASH SITE
- [ ] G - NATURE OF TERRAIN
- [ ] H - WEATHER
- [ ] Y - OTHER

11. RESCUE VEHICLE PROBLEMS ENROUTE None

- [ ] A - HEADWIND
- [ ] B - POOR VISIBILITY
- [ ] C - HIGH SEA STATE
- [ ] D - MECHANICAL PROBLEMS
- [ ] E - NATURE OF TERRAIN
- [ ] F - OTHER OBSTRUCTIONS (FENCES, ETC.)
- [ ] G - RESCUERS LOST
- [ ] H - WEATHER
- [ ] Y - OTHER

12. PROBLEMS IN LOCATING INDIVIDUAL (OR KEEPING IN SIGHT) None

- [ ] A - HEAVY SEAS
- [ ] B - TREES
- [ ] C - FOG/CLOUDS
- [ ] D - PRECIPITATION
- [ ] E - DARKNESS
- [ ] F - RADIO INTERFERENCE
- [ ] G - CONFUSION DUE TO OTHER LIGHTS
- [ ] H - MALFUNCTION OF DIRECTIONAL EQUIPMENT
- [ ] J - LACK OF CORRECT INFORMATION ON LOCATION OF SURVIVOR
- [ ] K - INABILITY TO VISUALLY DISTINGUISH SURVIVOR FROM TERRAIN
- [ ] L - LOSS OF RADIO/RADAR CONTACT
- [ ] M - SURVIVOR'S FAILURE TO USE SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- [ ] Y - OTHER

13. LOCATOR MEANS

Consult Instructions for listing of specific locator means and enter under appropriate categories. Use numbers to indicate sequence of observance.

GENERAL	PYROTECHNICS	ELECTRONIC SIGNAL DEVICES	BALLISTICS	AUDITORY	VISUAL
Located visually in fireball just to left of runway - no special signalling devices used - used only normal tower and ambulance radios.					

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

14. SURVIVAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY THIS PERSON **Death on ground impact/fire**

- [ ] 01 - INADEQUATE FLOTATION GEAR
- [ ] 02 - INADEQUATE COLD WEATHER GEAR
- [ ] 03 - LACK OF SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- [ ] 04 - LACK OF OTHER EQUIPMENT
- [ ] 05 - ENTANGLEMENT (PARACHUTE)
- [ ] 06 - DRAGGING (PARACHUTE)
- [ ] 07 - PARACHUTE HARDWARE PROBLEM
- [ ] 08 - ENTRAPMENT IN AIRCRAFT
- [ ] 09 - PULLED DOWN BY SINKING PARACHUTE
- [ ] 10 - ENTANGLEMENT (OTHER THAN PARACHUTE)
- [ ] 11 - UNFAMILIAR WITH PROCEDURES/EQUIPMENT
- [ ] 12 - CONFUSED, DAZED, DISORIENTED
- [ ] 13 - INCAPACITATED BY INJURY
- [ ] 14 - POOR PHYSICAL CONDITION
- [ ] 15 - EXPOSURE (HEAT, COLD, SUNBURN, ETC.)
- [ ] 16 - FATIGUE
- [ ] 17 - WEATHER
- [ ] 18 - TOPOGRAPHY (SWAMPS, MOUNTAINS, DESERTS, ETC.)
- [ ] 19 - DARKNESS
- [ ] 20 - THROWN OUT OF RAFT
- [ ] 21 - HAMPERED BY HELO DOWNWASH
- [ ] 22 - PROBLEM BOARDING RESCUE VEHICLE
- [ ] 23 - THIRST
- [ ] 24 - HUNGER
- [ ] 25 - INSECTS, SNAKES, ANIMALS, ETC.
- [ ] 26 - SHARKS
- [ ] 99 - OTHER _____

15. PROBLEMS THAT COMPLICATED RESCUE OPERATIONS **Intense fire**

- [ ] 01 - FAILURE OF RESCUE VEHICLE (MECHANICAL PROBLEMS)
- [ ] 02 - INADEQUACY/LACK OF RESCUE VEHICLE
- [ ] 03 - FAILURE OF RESCUE EQUIPMENT (HOIST, ETC.)
- [ ] 04 - INADEQUACY/LACK OF RESCUE EQUIPMENT
- [ ] 05 - INADEQUACY OF RESCUE PERSONNEL KNOWLEDGE/TRAINING
- [ ] 06 - INADEQUATE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT
- [ ] 07 - INADEQUATE MEDICAL FACILITIES
- [ ] 08 - VEHICLE OPERATOR FACTOR (POOR PROCEDURE)
- [ ] 09 - RESCUE CREWMAN ASSIST HESITANCY
- [X] 10 - FIRE/EXPLOSION
- [ ] 11 - ENTRAPMENT IN AIRCRAFT
- [ ] 12 - PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS OF RESCUE PERSONNEL
- [ ] 13 - PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS OF PERSON BEING RESCUED
- [ ] 14 - CARELESSNESS OF RESCUE PERSONNEL
- [ ] 15 - PANIC/INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS OF PERSON BEING RESCUED
- [ ] 16 - RESCUE VEHICLE ACCIDENT
- [ ] 17 - COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS
- [ ] 18 - DRAG/ENTANGLEMENT BY DEPLOYED PARACHUTE
- [ ] 19 - TOPOGRAPHY (ROUGH SEAS, MOUNTAINS, ETC.)
- [ ] 20 - INTERFERENCE FROM OTHER VEHICLES
- [ ] 21 - VICTIM PULLED AWAY BY EXTERNAL FORCES
- [ ] 22 - WEATHER
- [ ] 23 - DARKNESS
- [ ] 24 - WEIGHT/DRAG PROBLEM NOT DUE TO PARACHUTE
- [ ] 25 - HAMPERED BY PERSONNEL/SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT OF PERSON BEING RESCUED
- [ ] 26 - FLOATING DEBRIS
- [ ] 27 - PRIMARY RESCUER DELAYED AWAITING FUTILE ATTEMPTS BY OTHER RESCUERS
- [ ] 28 - HAMPERED BY HELICOPTER DOWNWASH
- [ ] 99 - OTHER _____

16. INDIVIDUAL'S PHYSICAL CONDITION	DURING RESCUE	AFTER RESCUE		DURING RESCUE	AFTER RESCUE
1. FULLY ABLE TO ASSIST	1 -	A -	5. FATAL ON RECOVERY--DROWNED		E -
2. PARTIALLY ABLE TO ASSIST	2 -	B -	6. RECOVERED ALIVE--DIED FROM INJURIES		F -
3. IMMOBILE OR UNCONSCIOUS	3 -	C -	7. LOST DURING RESCUE ATTEMPT--PRESUMED DROWNED		G -
4. FATAL ON RECOVERY--DUE TO INJURIES	X	D -	8. LOST DURING RESCUE ATTEMPT--APPARENTLY INJURED OR DROWNED		H -

17. CHECK CATEGORY OF FACTORS THAT HELPED RESCUE/RECOVERY (FROM RESCUER POINT OF VIEW)

- [X] 1 - RESCUE PERSONNEL TRAINING
- [ ] 2 - TRAINING OF PERSON TO BE RESCUED
- [ ] 3 - KNOWLEDGE OF AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY ESCAPE MEANS
- [ ] 4 - KNOWLEDGE OF PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT RELEASES/ACTUATORS
- [X] 5 - RESCUE PROCEDURES/PRE-ACCIDENT PLANS
- [X] 6 - AVAILABILITY OF RESCUE EQUIPMENT
- [X] 7 - SUITABILITY OF RESCUE EQUIPMENT
- [ ] 8 - SURVIVOR'S TECHNIQUES
- [ ] 9 - COORDINATION OF RESCUE EFFORTS

In recovering the body expeditiously

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
BACHMEIER, James F. Jr.	(b) (6)	A-7A	152664

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
FLIGHT SURGEON'S COMMENTS, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OPNAV FORM 3750/1E (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-8100

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

See addendum I CONCLUSIONS AND ANALYSIS

See addendum II Recommendations

FLIGHT SURGEON PARTICIPATED FULLY IN INVESTIGATION	NO. OF HOURS SPENT	DATE OF REPORT
[X] YES [ ] NO	40	27 MAY 1969
FLIGHT SURGEON PARTICIPATED FULLY IN BOARD PROCEEDINGS	**NO. OF HOURS SPENT**	**NO. REPORTS PREPARED**
[X] YES [ ] NO	20	ONE (MOR)
FLIGHT SURGEON'S NAME AND GRADE	**DUTY STATION**	
(b) (6) LCDR MC USN	ATKRON - 122	(b) (6) [redacted]

ADDENDUM I

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALYSIS

1. The accident board concluded that the primary cause of this accident was the failure of the pilot, LTJG BACHMEIER, who had 400 flight hours, 82 A-7 hours, and was beginning his first night mirror landing practice, to monitor his flight instruments (night IFR/VFR flight) sufficiently to maintain a proper flight attitude to remain airborne.

2. Materiel failure/malfunction was ruled out after an exhaustive study of the wreckage. This study was greatly aided by a safety center investigator who joined the accident investigation team.

3. The possibility of an inflight fire in the oxygen mask was initially considered due to the pattern of burning inside the oxygen mask (see Enclosure 10.) This was discarded as a possibility due to lack of erratic motions of the aircraft and failure to find a similar burn pattern on the pilot's face. It is felt that this fire occurred after the impact and after the mask had been forced from the pilot's face.

4. The board concluded on the basis of consistent witness statements, ground impact scars, an exhaustive study of the flight controls and instruments and a reconstruction of the flight path using a similar aircraft, that the pilot flew the aircraft into the ground in controlled flight and unaware of his danger. See AAR Part 7, "INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS" for complete details.

5. Factors contributing to the pilot's break-down in scan include: 1) taking interval on aircraft breaking overhead, 2) unnecessary radio transmissions by other aircraft making the pattern more hectic than

(ADDENDUM I, Continued:)

necessary (see Enclosure 1,) 3) fatigue -- see 72 hour statement.

6. It is concluded by the board that the pilot did not recognize his difficulty and made no attempt at ejection. He was killed instantly by violent ground impact and burned severely by the fireball. The pilot came to rest 15 feet short of the cockpit.

7. The pilot was observed to be somewhat "shaky" on his first two passes (by the LSO's.) On his third pass he was noted to touch-down, add full power, then reduce power normally (at 265 feet AGL) in a transition which should have been to level flight. He instead transitioned to a nose down attitude and impacted the ground at 145 knots in controlled nearly wings level flight 4-5 seconds following the transition. The tower operator observed the entire sequence (see Enclosure 3) but was unable to warn the pilot in time as the LSO was instructing a plane in apparent trouble at the 180° position and the tower operator did not want to break in on this as he did not know for sure that BACHMEIER was in trouble until the time for action had passed. He merely called "crash" an instant before the aircraft impacted. The very gentle transition to a nose down attitude added to the tower operator not realizing that an emergency existed until it was too late.

8. In conclusion, the board feels that the pilot flew his aircraft into the ground under controlled conditions, totally unaware of his danger and that no ejection attempt was made, the pilot being thrown clear of the aircraft by impact forces. The ejection system was totally destroyed by forces of impact and intense fire. Inattention to flight instruments for the brief 4-5 seconds while transitioning following climb, while

(ADDENDUM I, Continued:)

looking for his interval, caused the accident. Searching for his interval and interpreting their relative movement, distraction induced by spurious radio transmissions during his three approaches, disruption of his interval with the arrival of additional aircraft, fatigue after a long day and a demanding earlier flight, plus a mid-air collision that had occurred in the squadron a few hours earlier (and may have caused him to look outside the cockpit too long for other aircraft,) as well as having had an instrument failure on an earlier flight that day and flying an aircraft that had a gyro "gripe" fixed that day (which may have caused him to momentarily mistrust his instruments at a critical time;) all could have combined to cause a scan breakdown. The lack of a visible horizon made it a necessity to fly primarily on instruments. LTJG BACHMEIER was noted to have minor scan and instrument navigation difficulties on previous flights. He was noted to be "shaky" and possibly apprehensive on his earlier passes on this flight. Any or all of these conditions may have combined to cause scan breakdown and proved fatal to the pilot.

ADDENDUM II

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the importance of adequate rest before demanding flights be re-emphasized. That pilots accordingly structure their private activities to allow for adequate rest, as schedules cannot reasonally be expected to schedule around personal habits/activities.

2. That the importance of a good scan be re-emphasized, especially as regards night IFR/VFR flying.

3. That the importance of all planes in such a pattern maintaining proper radio discipline be re-emphasized.

4. That the special danger of disorientation resulting from fixating on moving lights in a dark sky be re-emphasized.

5. That tower operators and LSO's who work night mirror landing practice meet periodically to discuss problems/dangers in the pattern to gain a clearer understanding of mutual capabilities, responsibilities and means of avoiding disasters.

6. (b) (5) [redacted]

7. That aircraft with gyro "gripes" which have been fixed not be sent on night missions until they have been proven under actual flight condition on a day flight.

8. This flight involved a pilot who had experienced gyro failure on an afternoon flight. He was given an aircraft for his first night mirror landing practice flight which had had a gyro gripe on its previous flight. This gripe had been corrected by replacing a "black box" (See AAR for details) but had not been tested in actual flight.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6F SERIES

INDEX OF ENCLOSURES

Enclosure Number	Enclosure Title
1.	Transcript of tower tape during the accident flight (see AAR Enclosure 2.)
2.	Statement of LSO LT (b) (6) concerning accident (see AAR Enclosure 3.)
3.	Statement of control tower operator (b) (6) AC2/USN (b) (6) witness of entire accident evolution (see AAR Enclosure 4.)
4.	Statement of civilian crash crew member R. L. BASSET (see AAR Enclosure 5.)
5.	Statement of witness (b) (6) AN/USN.
6.	Statement of pilot witness in the break at the time of the accident LTJG (b) (6) USN (see AAR Enclosure 12.)
7.	AEROMEDICAL FINDINGS.
8.	AUTOPSY REPORT.
9.	POST-MORTEM X-RAY RESULTS ON pilot BACHMEIER.
10.	Photograph of oxygen mask showing over-all pattern of burning.
11.	Photograph of oxygen mask showing inside pattern of burning.

MOR 15-69A VA-122
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST. 3750.6P SERIES.

SUMMARY AND AEROMEDICAL CONCLUSIONS FROM SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVIEWS AND ANALYSIS OF PHYSIOPATHOLOGICAL FINDINGS.

LTJG BACHMEIER was a dedicated, conscientious, very highly motivated, studious Naval Aviator. Friends and his wife agree that "he just lived for flying." Flying "was his whole life -- not just an avocation." He enjoyed flying thoroughly and gave his greatest effort to it. He was dedicated and safety oriented. He was noted by nearly all IP's questioned to be the most attentive person at nearly all briefs which he attended. He had 400 total flight hours of which 82 were in the A-7 aircraft. He had arrived directly from the training command and had completed all of the A-7 replacement pilot syllabus with the exception of field mirror landing practice, carrier qualifications and three advanced stage flights. He had done well throughout the syllabus. He was designated a Naval Aviator in August, 1968. He had above average flight grades through basic and advanced training. He had minor difficulties in instrument training, being a somewhat compulsive individual, but "basic Instruments" here at Lemoore went very well although his performance was very slightly below average. He progressed smoothly in the A-7 program. Minor scan difficulties were noted but were not of a serious nature. He had recently returned from a Yuma, Arizona weapons deployment associated with night flying where he experienced minor difficulties with night low pull-outs. IP's made this problem abundantly clear to him. Generally he showed average ability. So problems were slight and consisted of: 1) slightly slow scan, 2) slightly below average instrument work, 3) low pull-out at night; all of which were carefully and forcefully discussed with IP's prior to the accident flight.

SUMMARY AND AEROMEDICAL CONCLUSIONS FROM SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVIEWS AND ANALYSIS OF PHYSIOPATHOLOGICAL FINDINGS. (Continued:)

LTJG BACHMEIER was noted to be a very confident aviator but not a chance-taker. He did know the difference between professionalism and foolhardy chance-taking. He would accept nearly any reasonable challenge.

LTJG BACHMEIER was in excellent physical and emotional health prior to and during the flight on which the accident occurred. He had studied hard and prepared well for the evening flight. His attention was perhaps concentrated on his past success of that afternoon (see 72 hour statement) rather than being concerned primarily with the flight at hand (night MLP.) He was noted to be very "pumped up" for flight in general the evening of the accident. He was not operating under the added burdens of inadequate diet, or anxiety. He may have suffered from lack of sleep as he was unable to sleep or relax between his very demanding and exhausting afternoon (1618-1830) flight and the following early morning flight. He had been continuously awake for 15½ hours prior to the accident. He was quite anxious having just flown the most demanding flight in the syllabus and being faced with his first NMLP. There was no unwise dietary intake of food or alcohol. All who saw him stated that the pilot looked rested, confident, proud and ready for flight.

No persistent factors of social, psychiatric or human significance were operative in causing the accident. The cause would appear to be as stated in "CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION," this report.

LTJG BACHMEIER's adjustment to family, peer group, community position and vocational role were above reproach. He was the head of a happy, well adjusted family and loved his work.

SUMMARY AND AEROMEDICAL CONCLUSIONS FROM SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVIEWS AND ANALYSIS OF PHYSIOPATHOLOGICAL FINDINGS. (Continued:)

The best summary is given in the words of his wife. "In conclusion, Jim's last hours were normal. He ate well, slept well and loved well. He loved the Navy and his flying and wouldn't have been happy doing anything else."

Standard Form 503
Revised August 1954
Bureau of the Budget
Circular A-32 (Rev.)

CLINICAL RECORD | **AUTOPSY PROTOCOL**

DATE AND HOUR DIED	A. M. / P. M.	DATE AND HOUR AUTOPSY PERFORMED	A. M. / P. M.	CHECK ONE: FULL AUTOPSY	HEAD ONLY	TRUNK ONLY
May 7, 1969 0128		May 7, 1969 1230		X		

PROSECTOR: (b) (6) CDR MC USN
ASSISTANT: None

CLINICAL DIAGNOSES (Including operations)

Aircraft Accident

WITNESSES: LCDR (b) (6)
NAS Lemoore
Flt. Surg., VA-122

GROSS PROVISIONAL

(b) (6)

PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSES

(b) (6)

CAUSE OF DEATH: Aircraft accident resulting in multiple extreme injuries including:

(b) (6)

AUTOPSY SURGEON:

(b) (6)

APP (b) (6)
CDR MC USN

MILITARY ORGANIZATION (When required)	AGE	SEX	RACE	IDENTIFICATION NO.	AUTOPSY NO.
MAY 8 1969	24	M	C	(b) (6)	A69-49

PATIENT'S IDENTIFICATION (For typed or written entries give: Name—last, first, middle; grade; date; hospital or medical facility)

REGISTER NO.	WARD NO.
DE-662	DE-662

BACHMEIER, JAMES FLORAIN LTJG USNR ACT
NAVHOSP, Oakland, Calif.

A69-49

AUTOPSY PROTOCOL
Standard Form 503
503-104

Enclosure (8)
MOR 15-69A VA 122

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6F SERIES

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AUTOPSY REPORT

(Attach additional sheets of 8 x 10½ paper, as required)

Date: 7 May 69

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME	2. GRADE	3. SERVICE NUMBER	4. AGE
BACHMEIER, James Florian	LT(jg)	[redacted]	24

5. TIME (Date, Days, Hours)					6. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EMERGENCY (Estimated)
LAST REPORT FROM PILOT	CRASH	CASUALTY SURVIVED	DEATH	AUTOPSY	
0127	0128	No	0128	A-6949	Zero

7. AIRCRAFT		8. CRASH SITE
TYPE	NUMBER	
A-7A	152664	Runway 32 left, Naval Air Station, Lemoore, California

MEDICAL MEMBER OF BOARD

9. NAME	10. RANK/GRADE	11. SERVICE NO.	12. ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT
[redacted]	LCDR	[redacted]	VA-122

13. MAJOR INJURIES (List anatomical findings in order of importance stating probable cause of death and if possible, check which injuries were incurred ante- or post mortem.) (Attach additional sheets of paper, if required.)

14. CHECK APPROPRIATE NUMBER TO INDICATE WHERE INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED: 1- In aircraft in air; 2- In aircraft on ground; 3- On ejection; 4- Other; 5- Indeterminate when received. out of aircraft on ground

ITEM	INJURIES	ANTE.	POST.	1	2	3	4	5
A	[redacted]		X				X	
B							X	
C							X	
D							X	
E							X	

15. GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF FACTS AND EVENTS LEADING TO ACCIDENT AND OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION OR SUGGESTIONS Pilot in nigh mirror landing pattern. Touched down on runway and added power-climbed to 265 feet AGL. Then nosed over and flew into ground in nearly level flight attitude. No ejection; explosion and fire on impact.

16. STATE BRIEFLY POSITION AND DISTANCE OF BODY OR FRAGMENTS WITH RESPECT TO AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE Found in midst of burning wreckage 15 feet proximal to cockpit and main fuselage beside ejection seat which was fragmented and so badly charred as to be nearly unrecognizable as an ejection seat.

17. CONDITION OF WEARING APPAREL

ITEM	PRESENT	WORN	TORN	DIS-COLORED	BURNED	IN-PLACE	OFF-BODY	OTHER
HARNESS					X		X	almost entirely burned off body
PROTECTIVE HELMET		X		X	X		X	smashed and burned
VISOR		X					X	fragmented, no burning
OXYGEN MASK		X	X		X		X	
GLOVES								not worn
CLOTHING					X			burned off body
SHOES OR BOOTS					X			burned off body - completely burned
OTHER (Specify)								

CONDITION AND EXPOSURE OF BODY AT SITE OF CRASH

18. CONDITION (Gross description, extent of fragmentation and details of presence of fragments.)

[redacted]

20. EXPOSURE to ground impact [X] NONE and intense fire

	FIRE PRIOR TO CRASH		WATER
X	FIRE AFTER CRASH		DIST. AMB. ETC.
X	FUEL		OTHER (Specify)

SPECIFY TIME AND DEGREE Intense fire after being thrown from aircraft. (Evidently post-mortem)

19. COULD THE DECEASED HAVE TAKEN SEVERAL BREATHS BETWEEN TIME OF CRASH AND TIME OF DEATH [ ] YES [X] NO

DD FORM 1 JUN 65 1322 REPLACES DD FORM 000, 10 OCT 55, WHICH MAY BE USED. Enclosure (8)

MOR 15-69A VA-122 Enclosure (8) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F SERIES

CONDITION AT AUTOPSY

21. BODY	22. GENERAL	23. PRESERVATION
[X] COMPLETE	Severe 90% carbonization	[X] GOOD / [ ] ADVANCED POST MORTEM CHANGES
[ ] RIGHT ARM AMPUTATED		[ ] EARLY POST MORTEM CHANGES / [ ] PUTREFACTION
[ ] LEFT ARM AMPUTATED		24. STATE OF NUTRITION
[ ] RIGHT LEG AMPUTATED		[X] NORMAL [ ] OBESE [ ] EMACIATED
[ ] LEFT LEG AMPUTATED		THICKNESS OF SKIN AND SUBCUTANEOUS TISSUE OF ABDOMINAL WALL (CM): 5.7 centimeters
[ ] DECAPITATED		WEIGHT OF BODY: 205 pounds
[ ] DISINTEGRATED		LENGTH OF BODY: 72 inches

25. EXTERNAL/SKELETAL EXAMINATION

(Supplement with photographs where possible. Attach additional sheets of 8 x 10½ paper, as required.)

In each instance during External Examination specify exact location of the injury, abrasion, amputation, burn and degree, contusion, discoloration, hemorrhage, whether pre-existing or acquired. Also give opinion as to possible cause of injury.

In each instance during Skeletal Examination specify exact location and type of fracture or dislocation. X-rays to be used where possible. Give opinion as to probable direction and magnitude of force causing injury. Available skeletal diagrams should be used.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

Enclosure (8)

AI[illegible]AFT ACCIDENT AUTOPSY REPORT Date: 7 May 69

INTERNAL

(The degree of injury should be assessed as Mild+; Moderate++; Severe+++; or Extreme++++; Organs showing significant pathologic changes should be preserved. Attach additional sheets of paper, as required.)

26. BRAIN

(The whole brain should be preserved in 10% N. Formalin after tissue is removed for toxicology.)

☐ NORMAL ☐ MISSING	☐ AID EMBOLISM	WEIGHT (b) (6)	PRE-EXISTING LESIONS	CONTUSION	HEMORRHAGE (Degree) (b) (6)

LACERATION: None

CONDITION OF CEREBRAL VESSELS (Especially basilar): (b) (6)

27. SPINAL CORD

(Spinal cords are important, remove at all times)

☒ NORMAL ☐ MISSING	PRE-EXISTING LESIONS (b) (6)	DAMAGE SUSTAINED

28. SINUSES

☐ NORMAL ☐ MISSING	HEMORRHAGE NOT EXAMINED	OTHER

29. GLOTTIS

☒ NORMAL ☐ MISSING	(b) (6)	HEMORRHAGE None

30. MIDDLE AND INNER EAR

	NORMAL	MISSING	HEMORRHAGE (Degree)	OTHER (Specify)
RIGHT	NOT EXAMINED			
LEFT				

31. EYES

	NORMAL	MISSING	HEMORRHAGE (Degree)	OTHER (Specify)
RIGHT	(b) (6)			(b) (6)
LEFT				

32. ORAL CAVITY

☒ NORMAL ☐ MISSING	OTHER LESIONS (b) (6)

33. LARYNX

☒ NORMAL ☐ MISSING	EDEMA (b) (6)	FRACTURE OF CRICOID BONE	FRACTURE OF THYROID BONE	HEMORRHAGE (Degree)	OTHER (Specify) (b) (6)

34. PLEURAL SPACE

	NORMAL	MISSING	PRELIMINARY	HEMOTHORAX (CC) (b) (6)	OTHER (Specify)
RIGHT					
LEFT					

LESIONS OF PLEURA: (b) (6)

35. TRACHEA

☒ NORMAL ☐ MISSING	VOMITUS (b) (6)	BLOOD (b) (6)	OTHER None	EVIDENCE OF ANTE-MORTEM BURNING (b) (6)

36. LUNGS

(Specify lesions by lobes when indicated)

	RIGHT (b) (6)	LEFT
NORMAL		
WEIGHT		
MISSING		
ATELECTASIS		
EDEMA		
CYST/TUBE		
FAT EMBOLISM		
HEMORRHAGE (b) (6)		
EMPHYSEMA		
MOTTLING: BID DAMAGING		
MOTTLING: NO BID DAMAGING		
EVIDENCE OF DROWNING No		
OTHER (Specify)		

37. GREAT VESSELS

☒ NORMAL ☐ MISSING	PRE-EXISTING LESIONS None

TRAUMA (Describe): (b) (6)

38. PERICARDIUM

☐ NORMAL (b) (6) ☐ MISSING

PRE-EXISTING LESIONS: (b) (6)

HEMOPERICARDIUM (CC): (b)

PETECHIAE ON VISCERAL SURFACE: (b) (6)

RUPTURE No	OTHER (Specify)

3

Enclosure (8)

ENCLOSURE (8) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 5720.44 SERIES

INTERNAL (Continued)

39. HEART

☐ NORMAL ☐ MISSING ☐ EVIDENCE OF AID DUBOLISM: None of the above	WEIGHT: 380 Gm	PATENT FORAMEN OVALE (Size also): Closed	PRE-EXISTING LESIONS (Describe): (b) (6)

INJURIES (Describe)

DEGREE: Mild	INVOLVEMENT: (b) (6)	CAUSE: (b) (6)	ENDOCARDIAL RUPTURE: (b) (6)
FULL THICKNESS RUPTURE: None	STATE OF CORONARY VESSELS (Describe): (b) (6)		

40. PERITONEUM

☒ NORMAL ☐ MISSING

PRE-EXISTING LESIONS: (b) (6)

OTHER LESIONS: (b) (6)

TYPE & AMOUNT OF FLUID: (b) (6)

41. STOMACH

☒ NORMAL ☐ MISSING

PRE-EXISTING LESIONS: (b) (6)

DISTENTION:

RUPTURE:

NATURE OF CONTENTS: (b) (6)

42. INTESTINES

☒ NORMAL ☐ MISSING

PRE-EXISTING LESIONS: (b) (6)

DISTENTION (Describe): (b) (6)

HEMORRHAGE (Degree):

43. LIVER

☐ NORMAL No ☐ MISSING

WEIGHT: (b) (6)

PRE-EXISTING LESIONS:

TRAUMA (Degree and cause): (b) (6)

OTHER LESIONS (Describe): (b) (6)

44. SPLEEN

☒ NORMAL ☐ MISSING

WEIGHT: (b) (6)

PRE-EXISTING LESIONS:

TRAUMA (Degree and Cause): (b) (6)

OTHER LESIONS: (b) (6)

45. PANCREAS

☒ NORMAL ☐ MISSING

WEIGHT: (b)

PRE-EXISTING LESIONS: (b) (6)

TRAUMA (Degree and Cause): (b) (6)

OTHER LESIONS: (b) (6)

46. KIDNEY

	RIGHT	LEFT
NORMAL	(b) (6)	
MISSING		
WEIGHT		
TRAUMATIC LESIONS (Describe)		
OTHER LESIONS (Describe)		

47. BLADDER

☒ NORMAL ☐ MISSING

PRE-EXISTING LESIONS: (b) (6)

DISTENTION: (b) (6)

CONTENTS: (b) (6)

RUPTURED: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

48. OTHER ORGANS

(Describe any lesions or traumatic changes noted in items listed below.)

THYMUS:	THYROID:	ADRENAL:	GALL BLADDER: (b) (6)
TESTIS AND PENIS:	PROSTATE: (b) (6)	PITUITARY: (b) (6)	LYMPH NODES: (b) (6)

49. BIOCHEMICAL AND TOXICOLOGICAL STUDIES

(In the event studies are not immediately available, please forward)

YES	NO		YES	NO	
		TISSUE LACTIC ACID FOR HYPOXIA			BLOOD SUGAR
		BLOOD ALCOHOL			TISSUE CARBON MONOXIDE
		TISSUE ALCOHOL			BLOOD CARBON MONOXIDE
		OTHER (Specify)			OTHER (Specify)

50. HISTOLOGICAL

(Attach additional sheets giving microscopic description and summary statement as to cause of death, antecedent causes or other significant conclusions.)

51. PATHOLOGIST PERFORMING GROSS AUTOPSY	52. ADDRESS
53. PATHOLOGIST PERFORMING HISTOLOGIC STUDY	54. ADDRESS

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT: PILOT BACHMEIER
RE: POST-MORTEM MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION ON PILOT LTJG JAMES FLORIAN BACHMEIER III
(b) (6)

A69-40

MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION

HEART: (b) (6)

LUNGS:

LIVER:

PANCREAS: (b) (6)

SPLEEN: (b) (6)

GASTROINTESTINAL TRACT: (b) (6)

ADRENALS: (b) (6)

KIDNEYS: (b) (6)

PROSTATE:

TESTES: (b) (6)

PITUITARY: (b) (6)

THYROID: (b) (6)

CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM: (b) (6)

TRACHEA; MULTIPLE SECTIONS: (b) (6)

AUTOPSY SURGEON:

(b) (6)
CDR MC USN/en

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE
COPY OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT.
(b) (6)
(b) (6) LCDR MC USNR

ENCLOSURE (8) MCR 15-69 A VA 122

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST.3750.6F SERIES

X-RAY RESULTS POST-MORTEM ON PILOT JAMES FLORIAN BACHMEIER, III, MOR 15-69A, VA-122

SKULL SERIES: (b) (6) [redacted]

LOWER TRUNK AND UPPER ABDOMEN: (b) (6) [redacted]

LEFT ARM: (b) (6) [redacted]

RIGHT ARM:

RIGHT FEMUR: (b) (6) [redacted]

LEFT FEMUR:

LEFT LEG: (b) (6) [redacted]

RIGHT LEG:

AP OF THE PELVIS: (b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]
LCDR MC USN

Film Number 12486-69 dated 7 MAY 1969

Enclosure (9)
MOR 15-69A VA-122
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST. 5750.6F SERIES.


DOWN

MOR 15-69A WA-122 7 MAY, 1969 Pilot: BACHOFFER, James Florian III
MOR Enclosure (11) Internal pattern of burning of oxygen mask.
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6F SERIES

"CLEARED FOR MINIMIZE"

MESSAGE DRAFT
5ND 4462 (Rev. 7-60)

(b) (6) [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

(b) (6) [redacted]

FROM	DRAFTER	DEPT.	RELEASED
NAVAL SAFETY CENTER	LCDR (b) (6) [redacted]	A.I.	CDR (b) (6) [redacted]

ACTION	√	PRECEDENCE	√	INFO
ATKRON ONE TWO TWO		Mail		NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ NAS LEMOORE
		Night Message		
	X	Routine	X	
		Priority		
		Op Immed.		
		Emer.		
		Flash		

TEXT

UNCLAS E F T O

37ØØ A-7A BUNO 152664 ACCIDENT

1. WRECKAGE RELEASED TO SENIOR MEMBER OF BOARD.

2. INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN OPNAVINST 375Ø.6F, PAGE 2Ø, PARA 32D APPLY.

REFERENCE MESSAGE

700 | 1938Z
4828 |
089 |

TRANSMIT BY RADIO —	CLASS OF REF.	CWO	FOR COMM. OFFICE	DATE/TIME GROUP
				161935Z MAY

A7A/152664 VA-122 15-69A 5/7/69

MESSAGE DRAFT
SND 4462 (Rev. 7-68)

CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 07 MAY 1969

FROM	DRAFT	DEPT.	RELEASED
NAVAL SAFETY CENTER	LCDR (b) (6) [redacted]	A.I.	CDR (b) (6) [redacted]

ACTION

ATKRON ONE TWO TWO

	PRECEDENCE	
	Mail	
	Night Message	
	Routine	X
X	Priority	
	Op Immed.	
	Emer.	
	Flash	

INFO

CNO
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
NAVPRO DALLAS
NAS LEMOORE

TEXT

UNCLAS E F T O

37ØØ A-7A BUNO 152664 ACCIDENT

1. LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] USN, (b) (6) [redacted] CLEARED TOP SECRET, WILL ARR FRESNO, CALIFORNIA VIA UNITED AIRLINES FLT 863 ~~LOCAL~~ 1215 LOCAL TO CONDUCT NAVSAFECEN INVESTIGATION OF SUBJ ACDT.

2. REQ BOQ BE PROVIDED.

3. INST CONTAINED IN OPNAV 3750.6F, PG 14, PARA 24B, and PG 2Ø, PARA 32A (PRESERVATION OF WRECKAGE) APPLY.

REFERENCE MESSAGE

TOD 427 4769 | MAY Ø714292

TRANSMIT BY RADIO—	CLASS OF REF.	CWO	TOR COMM. OFFICE	DATE/TIME GROUP
				Ø714152 MAY 69

A7A/152664 VA-122 15-69A 5/7/69

make CI

NNNNZCZCNASCA121CZCSLA339
PTTUZYUW RUWMHMA0039 1271237-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P 071237Z MAY 69
FM ATKRON ONE TWO TWO
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVSAFCEN
INFO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUEBJFA/BUPERS
RUEBBHB/CHNAVMAT
RUWISAA/COMTWELVE
RUWMHVA/COMFAIRALAMEDA
RUWJAPA/COMREDATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUCLSKA/COMREDATKCARAIRWING FOUR
ZEN/NAS LEMOORE
RUWTATB/NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LONG BEACH
RUEBPDA/DIRECTOR ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
RUWJABA/DIRECTOR AEROSPACE SAFETY, NORTON AFB
RUWJMRA/ATKRON ONE TWO TWO DET YUMA
RUCLSKA/ATKRON ONE SEVEN FOUR

STRIKE
AAR

00	01	011	012	013	014	015	02	02A	023	05	051
1	1		1	1			1			1	

TOR: _____ CHANNEL NUMBER 121B

INIT: BJ DATE _____

055	10	11	12	13	20	30	40	50	09	70	80
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7 May 69 15 22z

PAGE TWO RUWMHMA0039 UNCLAS
RUHGBMU/ATKRON TWO FIVE
ZEN/ATKRON TWO SEVEN
RUMFZFF/ATKRON THREE SEVEN
RUCLSKA/ATKRON FOUR SIX
ZEN/ATKRON FIVE SIX
RUCLSKA/ATKRON SIX SEVEN
RUCLSKA/ATKRON EIGHT TWO
RUCLSKA/ATKRON EIGHT SIX
RUHGBMU/ATKRON EIGHT SEVEN
ZEN/ATKRON NINE SEVEN
RUMFZFF/ATKRON ONE ZERO FIVE
ZEN/ATKRON ONE ONE THREE
RUYNIQM/ATKRON ONE FOUR SIX
RUMFHKG/ATKRON ONE FOUR SEVEN
RUYNIQM/ATKRON TWO ONE FIVE
RUWJATA/AIRDEVRON FIVE
RUWJAHA/AIRDEVRON FOUR
RUEBEEA/NATC PAXRIV
RUWJAHA/COMNAVMISCEN PT MUGU
BT

90507103

ATA/152664 VA-122 15-69A 5/7/69 MAY 071237Z

PAGE THREE RUWMHMA0039 UNCLAS
UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NAVY PRELIMINARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6F
1. 7 MAY 1969, 0128 T, NIGHT
2. NAS LEMOORE
3. A7A BUNO 152664
4. VA-122, SER 15-69A
5. ALFA
6. BACHMEIER, JAMES F., LTJG, (b) (6) USNR, (b) (6) ACTIVE, ALFA
TOTAL HOURS 397, A7A/B HOURS 80, LAST 90 DAYS 69. NO APPARENT EJECTION
ATTEMPTED
7. NONE
8. NONE
9. FCLP, 0.3 HRS, VFR NAS LEMOORE
10. TAKEOFF.
11. PILOT LAUNCHED DIRECTLY INTO NIGHT FCLP PATTERN COMPLETED ONE LOW
PASS AND TWO TOUCH AND GOS, AFTER THIRD PASS AIRCRAFT CLIMBED TO PATTERN
ALTITUDE, NOSED OVER AND CRASHED CLOSE ABOARD RUNWAY. AIRCRAFT BURNED ON
IMPACT.
12. HIGH THIN SCATTERED, 12MI VISIBILITY, WIND CALM, TEMP 54, DEW

PAGE FOUR RUWMHMA0039 UNCLAS
POINT 47, REL HUMID, 77, ALTIMITER 2983
13. NONE
14. NONE
15. NONE
16. WRECKAGE AVAILABLE FOR INVESTIGATION
17. T. W. POORE, LCDR, VA-122 ASO, AUTOVON 949-3271
BT
#0039

MAY
071237Z